Invocation of Article 311(2)(b) requires objective reasons, not mere gravity of allegations.

The applicant, Sumeet Kumar, joined the CBI as an LDC on 10.09.2012.

While posted in Mumbai, allegations arose that he conspired with a private individual, prepared and photographed sensitive internal note-sheets, and shared them to exert pressure for undue advantage, and misused official records and committed theft of an official stamp.

FIR No. RC-DAI-2021-A-0044 was registered on 21.12.2021 against the applicant for various IPC sections and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The applicant was arrested on 22.12.2021.

Considering the gravity of allegations, the Disciplinary Authority, invoking Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution and Rule 19 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, dismissed the applicant from service on 11.01.2022, dispensing with a regular departmental inquiry.

His departmental appeal was rejected on 24.11.2023.

Two prior O.A.s were withdrawn with liberty to file a consolidated one, leading to the present O.A. challenging the dismissal and appellate orders.

Subsequent to the dismissal, the final report/charge-sheet under Section 173 CrPC dropped the allegation under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, as no evidence was found to support it.

The criminal case proceeded to trial, with court orders dated 19.07.2025 and 30.08.2025.

Whether the invocation of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, dispensing with a regular departmental inquiry for dismissing the applicant, was justified and in accordance with law?

Whether the impugned dismissal order dated 11.01.2022 and the appellate order dated 24.11.2023 are illegal, arbitrary, and violative of the principles of natural justice?

The court primarily applied Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India and Rule 19 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, which permit dismissal without inquiry in specific circumstances.

It relied on the Constitution Bench judgment in *Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel* (1985) 3 SCC 398, establishing that dispensing with an inquiry is an exception requiring cogent, objective reasons demonstrating that it is "not reasonably practicable" due to compelling circumstances like intimidation of witnesses or threat to authorities, and that mere inconvenience or expediency is insufficient.

The Tribunal also applied its own precedent from *Bhagwan Singh v. Commissioner of Police* (O.A. No. 3598/2019) and *Ct. Sumit Sharma v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Others* (O.A. No. 1383/2020), which held that the disciplinary authority must record clear, cogent reasons for dispensing with an inquiry, and mere allegations or general observations are insufficient.

The standard of "not reasonably practicable" was defined by *Tulsi Ram Patel* to include situations where a civil servant terrorizes witnesses, threatens the disciplinary authority/inquiry officer, or an atmosphere of violence/indiscipline prevails.

The court found that the respondents' action of dispensing with a regular departmental inquiry and dismissing the applicant under Article 311(2)(b) was not sustainable.

The reasons provided for dispensing with the inquiry were identical to those found unsustainable in the *Bhagwan Singh* and *Ct. Sumit Sharma* cases, i.e., that it was "not reasonably practicable".

The Tribunal reiterated that dispensing with an inquiry is an exception to be invoked only in rare and compelling circumstances, and the respondents failed to provide cogent, objective, or contemporaneous material to demonstrate such impracticability.

The court noted that mere gravity of allegations or pendency of criminal proceedings alone does not justify invoking Article 311(2)(b).

Crucially, the subsequent dropping of the Prevention of Corruption Act charges in the criminal charge-sheet, and the orderly conduct of the criminal trial involving numerous witnesses, undermined the respondents' claim that a departmental inquiry was impracticable.

The court highlighted the absence of any specific material indicating intimidation of witnesses, threat to disciplinary authorities, or an atmosphere of violence, which are necessary conditions as per *Tulsi Ram Patel*.

The court distinguished the respondents’ reliance on cases like *Depot Manager, APSRTC v. Mohd. Yusuf Miya*, *State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena*, *Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd.*, *Indian Overseas Bank v. P. Ganesh*, and *Vineet Narain v. Union of India*, by noting they either concerned the permissibility of parallel proceedings (not dispensing with inquiry), limited scope of judicial review (whereas here the very invocation of Article 311(2)(b) was challenged), or specific instances of proved misconduct (unlike the present case’s initial lack of evidence for PC Act charges).

The court also distinguished *Neeraj Aggarwal v. Union of India* because that case involved direct evidence of illegal gratification, whereas the present applicant was not caught red-handed.

The impugned dismissal order dated 11.01.2022 and the appellate order dated 24.11.2023 were quashed and set aside.

The applicant was ordered to be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits as per relevant rules.

The respondents were directed to implement these directions within eight weeks from the receipt of the order.

However, the respondents were granted liberty to initiate and conclude regular disciplinary proceedings against the applicant strictly in accordance with law.

No order as to costs was made.