ITP Act proceedings are unsustainable without proof of the raiding officer’s Special Police Officer appointment.

The petitioner sought to quash two sets of proceedings under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (“ITP Act”): C.C. No. 3260/2017, arising from Barke Police Station Crime No. 8/2017, in which he was accused No. 5 of offences under Sections 3(1), 4, 5 and 8;

and C.C. No. 2311/2019, arising from Mangaluru East Police Station Crime No. 73/2017, in which he was accused No. 1 of offences under Sections 4 and 5.

He argued that the raids and investigation were invalid because the officers had not been notified or appointed as Special Police Officers under the ITP Act.

The State submitted that the raiding officer was an Inspector of Police but relied on no notification appointing him as a Special Police Officer.

Sections 13 and 15 of the ITP Act govern, respectively, the appointment and authority of Special Police Officers and the conduct of searches.

The Court noted that Section 15 permits a search without a warrant in the circumstances provided by that section, but the raid must be conducted by a Special Police Officer authorized under Section 13.

Relying on the coordinate Bench decisions discussed in Crl.P. No. 101909/2023, Crl.P. No. 201645/2023, Dharmanna v. State of Karnataka, Shri Rajath v. State of Karnataka and Mr. Praveen Kumar M.S. v. State of Karnataka, the Court treated compliance with the relevant statutory requirements as necessary and held that, absent a notification showing the investigating officer’s appointment as a Special Police Officer, the investigation could not be sustained.

The petitioner specifically challenged the officers’ authority to conduct the raids and investigate the ITP Act offences.

Although the State stated that the raiding officer held the rank of Inspector, it produced or relied on no notification appointing him as a Special Police Officer.

The Court held that rank alone did not establish the required statutory authorization and applied the coordinate Bench decisions concerning non-compliance with Sections 13 and 15.

It therefore found the same legal defect in both matters, notwithstanding that they arose from different police stations and involved different charges under the Act.