Judicial interference in tender matters requires mala fide, arbitrariness, or public interest impact.

The first respondent, District Rural Development Agency, floated a tender for the formation of a road.

The appellant firm, Sasi Road Finishers and Engineering Contractors, submitted its tender documents on 30.10.2025 and was found eligible.

The second respondent, M.S.Chinnakannu and Co, was initially disqualified on 24.11.2025 but was later admitted as a qualified bidder on 06.02.2026, enabling participation in financial bidding.

The appellant challenged this decision, seeking to quash the order dated 08.02.2026 and direct the first respondent to award the contract to the eligible and lowest bidder as of 24.11.2025, which led to W.P.No.5126 of 2026.

The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on 25.02.2026, leading to the present writ appeal.

The second respondent had previously filed W.P.No.46732 of 2025 after their technical bid was rejected for not filing an original affidavit under Clause 11.3 of the e-tender document, wherein an interim stay was granted.

This writ petition was withdrawn on 06.02.2026, and the first respondent issued a letter of acceptance to the second respondent, with work commencing thereafter.

1. Whether the tender inviting authority lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the second respondent's tender after initial disqualification on 24.11.2025, due to non-compliance with Clause 11.3 of the tender conditions?

2. Whether the learned Single Judge erred in finding no arbitrariness, mala fide, or violation in the tender process, and that the omission by the second respondent was curable and non-prejudicial?

The court primarily applied the principles governing judicial interference in tender matters, as established in *Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa* (2007) 14 SCC 517.

This precedent stipulates that courts should not interfere under Article 226 if the process adopted or decision made by the authority is not mala fide, not intended to favor someone, and not so arbitrary and irrational that no responsible authority acting reasonably could have reached it, provided public interest is not adversely affected.

Additionally, the scope of a letters patent appeal was considered, as expounded in *Baddula Lakshmaiah v. Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple* (1996) 3 SCC 52, which confines the appellate court to reviewing the correctness of the order passed by the learned Single Judge within the same jurisdiction.

The court engaged in an analysis of the learned Single Judge's decision, who, after perusing the original file, concluded that there was no violation in the tender process, nor any arbitrary extension of time, or mala fide attributable to the first respondent in awarding the contract.

The learned Single Judge found that for every minor error or unsavory action in the tender process, judicial interference is not warranted, especially when the larger public interest of road construction in a remote village is considered.

The learned Additional Advocate General argued that the second respondent's omission to submit the original affidavit within the prescribed time was a curable, non-prejudicial, and procedural in nature, and highlighted a significant difference of Rs. 26 lakhs between the rates quoted by the second respondent and the appellant.

Applying the *Jagdish Mandal* tests, the court noted that the Single Judge had definitively found no arbitrariness or mala fide and that the project served a larger public interest.

Consistent with *Baddula Lakshmaiah*, the appellate court limited its review to the correctness of the Single Judge's order.

The court found no error in the order passed by the learned Single Judge warranting interference, thereby affirming the Single Judge's decision that there was no arbitrariness or mala fide in the tender process and that the award of the contract to the second respondent served the larger public interest of road construction.

The interim applications were closed.