Judicial recusal cannot be mandated by a litigant's subjective apprehension of bias lacking objective proof.

The Petitioner (CBI) filed a revision petition challenging the Trial Court’s order dated 27.02.2026, which discharged the Respondents in the "Delhi Excise Policy" case.

On 09.03.2026, the Court issued notice and stayed departmental action against the Investigating Officer (IO).

Respondents 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, and 19 (including Arvind Kejriwal and Manish Sisodia) moved applications seeking the recusal of Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma.

The grounds for recusal included: (i) the Court’s previous detailed judgments in the same matter (bail and arrest challenges) where strong observations were recorded; (ii) alleged "undue haste" in scheduling hearings compared to other roster matters; (iii) the Judge’s participation in seminars organized by the Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad, suggesting ideological bias; (iv) the empanelment of the Judge’s relatives on Central Government panels, alleging a conflict of interest; and (v) the recording of prima facie observations on the first date of hearing without hearing the Respondents.

The Court applied the test of "reasonable apprehension of bias" as established in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India.

It relied on Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal, holding that prior judicial views on law or facts do not constitute bias or pre-disposition.

The Court emphasized the "duty to sit" doctrine from Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (NJAC), stating that a Judge must not recuse at the mere asking of a litigant unless the ground is legally justified.

It further cited Neelam Manmohan Attavar v. Manmohan Attavar regarding the prohibition of "forum shopping" or browbeating the Court.

Procedurally, the Court adhered to Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, which mandates the prioritized and expeditious disposal of criminal cases involving MPs and MLAs.

The Court held that recusal cannot be forced by a litigant and must be based on objective standards rather than subjective unease.

It reasoned that prima facie observations in interim orders are tentative and necessary for reasoned adjudication, and challenging such orders lies in appeal, not recusal.

Regarding subject-matter bias, the Court noted that prior judgments (bail/arrest) were decided on distinct statutory parameters (e.g., Section 19/45 PMLA) and specifically marked as non-final.

On ideological bias, the Court observed that attending Bar-organized legal seminars is a routine professional interaction and does not imply political sympathy.

Regarding the conflict of interest, the Court found no nexus between the lis and the independent careers of its relatives, stating that empanelment is a professional right and does not influence judicial decision-making.

Finally, the Court dismissed allegations of "haste," citing the binding Division Bench and Supreme Court directives to fast-track MP/MLA cases.

It held that a Judge’s reputation and the institution’s integrity cannot be surrendered to manufactured allegations or social media narratives.

The Court concluded that the Respondents failed to meet the threshold of "reasonable apprehension of bias" from the perspective of a fair-minded observer.

The Court directed that the main revision petition be heard on its merits, unaffected by the recusal proceedings.