Judicial review cannot reappraise disciplinary evidence absent natural justice violations, procedural irregularity, or perversity.

The Applicant, an Assistant Audit Officer and member of Civil Party 4, participated in the audit of the Joint Director of Health Services, Krishnagiri, from 1 September 2014 to 12 September 2014.

He was charge-sheeted on 4 March 2015 for alleged deficiencies in the audit, including failure to furnish the declaration required under the Code of Ethics and lapses in the Draft Inspection Report. He was also charged with accepting transportation, accommodation, food and other facilities allegedly arranged by the auditee department, in violation of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

The Applicant denied the charges and challenged the disciplinary proceedings on grounds of delay, denial of opportunity to cross-examine material witnesses, non-examination of defence witnesses, reliance on evidence from a separate inquiry, violation of natural justice, and lack of reliable evidence.

Following the inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority imposed reduction of pay by one stage for one year, with consequential effect on future increments. The Appellate Authority affirmed the penalty.

1. Whether the disciplinary inquiry was vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity, procedural irregularity, bias, or reliance on inadmissible or insufficient evidence.

2. Whether the findings of misconduct recorded by the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities were unsupported by evidence or otherwise perverse and liable to be interfered with in judicial review.

3. Whether the penalty of reduction of pay by one stage for one year was disproportionate or otherwise warranted interference by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal applied Rule 3(1)(ii), Rule 3(1)(iii), Rule 3(1)(vi) and Rule 13 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964, as well as the applicable provisions of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 governing disciplinary inquiries.

It relied principally on State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557, which holds that judicial review in disciplinary matters is supervisory rather than appellate; courts may interfere for violation of natural justice, breach of prescribed procedure, consideration of extraneous matters, findings based on no evidence, or conclusions that no reasonable person could reach, but may not reappreciate the adequacy or reliability of evidence.

The Tribunal also applied B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, under which disciplinary and appellate authorities have primary discretion regarding punishment, and judicial interference with penalty is justified only where the punishment shocks the conscience, ordinarily by remitting the matter for reconsideration.

The Tribunal held that the Applicant had not established any jurisdictional error, procedural violation causing prejudice, mala fides, or denial of a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.

The inquiry record showed that he was allowed to submit his defence and participate in the proceedings, while the Inquiry Officer and authorities considered his objections concerning the proposed witnesses and the alleged deficiencies in the Inspection Report.

Applying the limited standard of judicial review, the Tribunal declined to reassess the evidence or substitute its own view for that of the departmental authorities.

It found that the conclusions regarding the audit lapses and acceptance of facilities from the auditee were supported by material on record and were not findings based on no evidence or conclusions that no reasonable person could reach.

The penalty was also not considered disproportionate, particularly since the Appellate Authority regarded the misconduct as serious and the Disciplinary Authority had adopted a relatively lenient punishment.

The penalty of reduction of pay by one stage for one year was upheld, the Original Application was dismissed as devoid of merit, and no order as to costs was made.