Judicial review cannot reassess disciplinary evidence absent procedural unfairness, perversity, or jurisdictional error.

The applicant, an Assistant Audit Officer, was deputed to audit the Joint Director of Health Services, Krishnagiri, from 1–12 September 2014.

During the pendency of disciplinary proceedings arising from an earlier charge-sheet concerning alleged audit lapses and acceptance of hospitality, the applicant addressed a letter dated 4 May 2016 to the Joint Director, criticising an officer and requesting disciplinary action against Dr. G. Ashok Kumar, who had been cited as a prosecution witness in the earlier inquiry.

A second charge-sheet dated 8 August 2016 alleged that the applicant had exceeded his authority, violated the applicable manuals and Rule 3(1)(iii), (vi) and (xviii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964, and attempted to influence or “tamper with” a witness.

The Inquiry Officer found both charges proved after the applicant participated in the inquiry and submitted his defence.

The Disciplinary Authority imposed reduction of pay by two stages for two years, without increments during that period and with postponement of future increments; the Appellate Authority rejected the applicant’s appeal.

The applicant challenged both orders before the Tribunal, alleging denial of natural justice, failure to examine material witnesses, bias, improper splitting of charges and disproportionate punishment.

1. Whether the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated by violation of natural justice because material prosecution witnesses were not summoned or examined, thereby denying the applicant an effective opportunity of cross-examination?

2. Whether the second charge-sheet was impermissibly issued during the pendency of the earlier disciplinary proceeding and amounted to an arbitrary splitting of charges?

3. Whether the findings of misconduct and the orders of the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities were unsupported by evidence, procedurally irregular, biased or otherwise liable to be interfered with in judicial review?

4. Whether the penalty imposed on the applicant warranted interference on the ground of disproportionality?

The Tribunal applied the limited scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters under the principles stated in State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557, namely that the reviewing court does not act as an appellate court, reappreciate evidence or assess its adequacy, but may interfere where the inquiry violates natural justice or statutory procedure, relies on no evidence, is perverse, or is affected by irrelevant considerations.

It also relied on B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, which holds that disciplinary and appellate authorities are the primary fact-finding bodies and that a Tribunal should not ordinarily substitute its own penalty unless the punishment shocks its conscience; in such a case, it may remit the matter for reconsideration or, exceptionally, modify the punishment for cogent reasons.

The Tribunal further applied Rule 3(1)(iii), (vi) and (xviii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964, requiring government servants to maintain conduct becoming of a government servant, high ethical standards and adherence to applicable laws, rules and established practices.

The Tribunal held that the two charge-sheets concerned distinct acts: the first related to alleged irregularities and acceptance of hospitality during the audit, whereas the second concerned the applicant’s subsequent letter criticising an officer and seeking action against a person cited as a prosecution witness. Therefore, the second proceeding did not constitute impermissible splitting of charges.

The applicant had been given an opportunity to participate in the inquiry, submit his defence and place his objections before the Inquiry Officer and Disciplinary Authority; the Tribunal found no procedural violation or demonstrated prejudice arising from the non-examination of the requested witnesses.

The applicant’s act of addressing the auditee institution in his official capacity, without approval, and seeking action against a prosecution witness was treated as conduct inconsistent with the applicable manuals and service rules.

Applying the principles in Chitra Venkata Rao and B.C. Chaturvedi, the Tribunal declined to reassess the evidence or substitute its view for that of the disciplinary authorities, finding that the conclusions were supported by the record and were neither arbitrary nor perverse.

Although paragraph 15 refers to a penalty of reduction by one stage for one year, the operative factual and procedural portions record the imposed penalty as reduction by two stages for two years; the Tribunal nevertheless found no basis for interfering with the punishment.

The Original Application was accordingly dismissed, and the impugned orders of the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities were left undisturbed. No order as to costs was made.