Judicial review cannot substitute expert opinion on answer keys or disturb settled selection processes at a belated stage.

The petitioners applied for the posts of Assistant Review Officer and Review Officer following an advertisement issued by the Uttarakhand Public Service Commission (UKPSC) on 05.04.2016.

After participating in the selection process, the petitioners failed to qualify.

They challenged the results by seeking a Mandamus to treat Option ‘A’ (Coolant) as the correct answer for Question No. 98 of SET-B, rather than Option ‘B’ (Moderator) as determined by the Commission.

The selection process concluded in 2019, and all successful candidates were appointed that same year.

Furthermore, a subsequent selection process for the same posts was initiated in 2023 and concluded in 2025.

1. Whether the Court, in the exercise of judicial review, can substitute its own opinion for that of subject experts regarding the correctness of an answer key.

2. Whether a challenge to a selection process can be entertained at a belated stage after the appointments have been finalized and subsequent recruitment cycles have concluded.

The Court applied the settled principle of limited judicial review in academic matters, which mandates that the judiciary cannot sit in appeal over the technical opinions of subject experts.

It further relied on the doctrine of finality in public recruitment, which suggests that courts should decline interference in selection processes when such interference would disturb the settled rights of already-appointed third parties not joined in the litigation and cause administrative chaos long after the process has concluded.

The Court observed that the question paper and the answer key were prepared by subject experts, whose professional opinion designated "Moderator" as the correct answer for the question on "Heavy Water".

The Court emphasized that it lacks the jurisdiction to re-evaluate academic merits or override expert findings in a writ petition.

Since the successful candidates were appointed in 2019 and a new selection cycle had already been completed by 2025, any revision of the marks at this stage would unfairly jeopardize the positions of employees who were not party to the proceedings.

The Court found that the administrative disruption caused by revising the merit list after several years outweighed the petitioners' claims.

It held that academic expert opinions are not subject to standard judicial appeal and that the petition was barred by the delay and the potential prejudice to settled third-party interests.

The writ petition was dismissed.