Judicial review cannot substitute tender authorities’ interpretation absent perversity, mala fides, or patent arbitrariness.

SAIL issued a Bid Invitation dated 04.11.2025, modified by corrigendum dated 06.12.2025, for “Comprehensive Outsourcing Services – MRD” at Bokaro Steel Plant.

The petitioner submitted its bid with experience certificates relating to two Tata Steel work orders dated 04.05.2018 and 01.08.2021.

SAIL treated the petitioner as technically ineligible, requiring experience of excavation of slag pits and processing of slag in a single work order.

SAIL afforded the petitioner repeated opportunities to clarify its eligibility and submit additional documents, but ultimately rejected the bid on 31.03.2026.

A reverse auction was conducted on 01.04.2026, in which Respondent No. 6 was declared L1.

Whether SAIL’s decision declaring the petitioner technically ineligible was arbitrary, irrational, perverse, or otherwise amenable to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Whether the petitioner’s experience under two separate work orders could be treated as one similar completed work for satisfying the tender eligibility criteria.

Whether SAIL acted discriminatorily in assessing the petitioner’s eligibility differently from its assessment in tenders concerning its Burnpur, Durgapur, and Bokaro plants, thereby violating Article 14.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to quashing of the reverse-auction outcome and a direction for a fresh auction permitting its participation.

The Court applied the settled principles of judicial review in government and public-sector tenders under Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651: review concerns the legality and decision-making process, including illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety, breach of natural justice, or abuse of power, and not the merits of the administrative decision.

Relying also on Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 216, Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL-SML, (2016) 8 SCC 622, and Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818, the Court held that constitutional courts must defer to the tendering authority’s interpretation of tender conditions unless the decision is mala fide, perverse, patently arbitrary, irrational, or intended to favour a bidder.

Kimberley Club Pvt. Ltd. v. Krishna Utpadan Mandi Parishad, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2323, was recognised for the principle that tender terms must be clear and that interference is warranted only where disqualification is de hors the NIT or patently arbitrary.

The Court also considered Article 14 principles governing reasonable and non-arbitrary State action, as discussed in Banshidhar Construction Private Limited v. Bharat Coking Coal Limited, (2024) 10 SCC 273.

The Court found that the tender required completion of “similar works,” each meeting the prescribed value thresholds, and defined similar work as excavation or extraction of slag metal from slag pits and its processing in an operating integrated steel plant.

The petitioner’s original documents referred to two distinct work orders issued nearly three years apart, and the claim that they constituted one composite work was not apparent from the tender-stage material.

SAIL repeatedly informed the petitioner of the deficiency and provided at least three opportunities to clarify and submit supporting documents; therefore, the decision-making process was transparent and consistent with natural justice.

The Court declined to reappraise the experience certificates or substitute its interpretation for that of the expert Evaluation Committee, holding that the Committee’s conclusion was at most a possible interpretation and was not perverse or irrational.

The belated certificate dated 28.08.2026, produced after substantial arguments without leave of the Court, could not retrospectively cure the deficiencies in the tender-stage documents.

The discrimination argument also failed because the eligibility conditions and scope of work in the other plant tenders had not been shown to be identical or comparable.

The petitioner’s experience under the two separate work orders could not, on the material produced, be treated as one similar completed work for tender eligibility, and the Court would not substitute its view for that of the expert Evaluation Committee.

The writ petition was dismissed; consequently, the challenge to the reverse auction and the request for a fresh auction permitting the petitioner’s participation were rejected.

No order as to costs was made, and pending interlocutory applications were disposed of.