Judicial review of disciplinary punishment is limited to perversity or shockingly disproportionate penalties.

Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against D.K. Mishra on five charges. The first Enquiry Officer recommended his transfer; after the Disciplinary Authority ordered a fresh enquiry, the second Enquiry Officer found proved the charge that Mishra had quarrelled with colleagues and disturbed official work, while other charges were not proved.

The Disciplinary Authority imposed stoppage of three annual increments with cumulative effect; the appellate authority affirmed the penalty, and the revisional authority reduced it to stoppage of two annual increments with cumulative effect.

The Central Administrative Tribunal dismissed Mishra’s original application, and he challenged that decision before the High Court.

1. Whether the Tribunal erred in declining to interfere with the disciplinary findings and penalty when only one charge was found proved and the petitioner alleged that the penalty was unsupported or disproportionate.

2. Whether the penalty of stoppage of two annual increments with cumulative effect was so disproportionate as to warrant judicial interference.

Relying on Union of India v. Parma Nanda, (1989) 2 SCC 177, and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, the Court applied the principle that a reviewing court or tribunal does not sit as an appellate authority over disciplinary findings or reappraise the evidence merely because another view is possible.

Interference with disciplinary action is limited to cases involving, among other grounds, arbitrariness or perversity in the findings or a punishment that is shockingly disproportionate.

The High Court found that the Disciplinary Authority accepted the second Enquiry Officer’s finding that the charge of disturbing official work and quarrelling with colleagues was proved, and was not in disagreement with that report; therefore, no reasons for disagreement were required.

The Court found no perversity in the enquiry or the imposition of the revised penalty, and held that the stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect was not shockingly disproportionate. A possible alternative view on reassessment of the record was insufficient to justify interference.

The Court dismissed the writ petition as devoid of merit.