Judicial scrutiny under Section 11 is confined to the prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement.

The Petitioner filed five petitions under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking the appointment of a sole arbitrator

The disputes arose from five similarly worded Development Agreements dated 30.06.2011, each containing an identical arbitration clause (Clause 20) providing for mutual appointment of an arbitrator with jurisdiction in Delhi

The Petitioner invoked arbitration via legal notices dated 21.12.2022

While the existence of the arbitration agreement was undisputed, the Respondent contended that the claims were barred by the law of limitation

On 27.03.2025, the Court observed that the limitation issue fell within the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal and directed parties to build a consensus on an arbitrator; however, the parties subsequently informed the Court that they were unable to reach an agreement

Whether the Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act, should adjudicate on the issue of limitation or "accord and satisfaction."

Whether the scope of judicial scrutiny under Section 11 is confined to the prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement.

The Court primarily applied Section 11(6) and 11(6-A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which limits judicial intervention to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement

It relied heavily on the three-judge bench decision in *SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning* (2024), which incorporated the principles of the seven-judge bench in *Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re*

These precedents established that the "negative effect of competence-competence" requires the Referral Court to leave contested issues like limitation, "accord and satisfaction," or "ex facie meritless" claims to the Arbitral Tribunal to protect arbitral autonomy

The Court reasoned that its role under Section 11 is "facilitative and procedural," intended only to resolve deadlocks in the appointment process

Citing *Krish Spinning*, the Court noted that the 2015 introduction of Section 11(6-A) legislatively overruled earlier expansive judicial reviews, meaning the Court must not engage in a "laborious enquiry" into the merits or technical bars like limitation

The Court found that since the petitions were filed within three years of the invocation notice, the dispute was not "non-existent"

By appointing an arbitrator, the Court does not dilute the Respondent's defenses but ensures that the principle of "minimum judicial interference" is upheld, leaving the Tribunal to "rule" on such objections under Section 16

Consequently, the Court appointed Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. R. Gavai, Former Chief Justice of India, as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes via a composite reference for all five matters

The arbitration is to be conducted under the aegis and rules of the Delhi International Arbitration Centre (DIAC)

All rights and contentions regarding the merits of the claims and counter-claims remain open for adjudication by the learned Arbitrator