Judicial scrutiny under Section 11 is confined to the prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement.

The Petitioner filed a petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("the Act"), seeking the appointment of a sole arbitrator to resolve disputes arising from a Loan Agreement dated 04.04.2024

Clause 8.2 of the Agreement provided for arbitration with the seat in Delhi

The Petitioner invoked arbitration via a Section 21 notice dated 04.09.2025

Despite being duly served, the Respondents failed to enter an appearance or file a reply

The valuation of the dispute was approximately Rs. 21 lakhs

Whether the Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act to appoint an arbitrator given the Respondents' failure to participate and the existence of a prima facie arbitration agreement

The court primarily applied Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, regarding the judicial appointment of arbitrators

It relied heavily on the precedent set by the Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning (2024) 12 SCC 1, which interpreted the scope of judicial scrutiny following the seven-judge Bench decision in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re

These precedents establish that the court’s role under Section 11 is limited to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement, leaving contested issues like "accord and satisfaction" or "frivolity" to the Arbitral Tribunal under the principle of competence-competence

The court determined that the statutory requirements for invoking arbitration under Section 21 had been satisfied

Following the "extremely circumscribed" standard of scrutiny mandated by Krish Spinning, the court focused solely on the existence of the arbitration agreement

It noted that since the Respondents were served but remained absent, there was no contest to the existence of the agreement

The court reasoned that its role is purely facilitative—to resolve the deadlock in the appointment procedure—and that any substantive contentions or challenges to the merits must be raised before the arbitrator

The court found that referring the matter to arbitration would uphold the principle of arbitral autonomy and judicial non-interference

The arbitrator was directed to file disclosures under Section 12(2) of the Act

The Court ordered that fees be governed by the Fourth Schedule of the Act and shared equally by both parties

All rights and contentions regarding the merits of the claims were left open for the arbitrator’s adjudication