Karnataka HC Quashes BJP Defamation Case Against Siddaramaiah, Shivakumar Over Posts-for-Sale Ad, Following Rahul Gandhi’s Earlier Relief

In brief

The question

1. Whether the criminal defamation proceedings against accused Nos. 1–3 could continue when a coordinate Bench had quashed proceedings against accused No. 4 on allegations arising from the same advertisement

The court held

The Court allowed both criminal petitions and quashed the proceedings in C.C. No. 7399 of 2024, arising out of P.C.R. No. 3878 of 2023, pending before the XLII Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru, insofar as they concerned the petitioners.

It also directed

Pending applications were also disposed of.

01Facts

The respondent BJP filed a private complaint under Section 200 of the CrPC alleging that an advertisement published by the Karnataka Pradesh Congress Committee in newspapers on 5 May 2023—concerning the prices of various posts in the BJP-led Government between 2019 and 2023—defamed the party.

pp. 5–6 · ¶ 3–4

After the complaint was filed on 9 May 2023, the Magistrate took cognizance of offences under Sections 499 and 500 IPC and issued summons.

pp. 5–6 · ¶ 3–4

Siddaramaiah, KPCC and D.K. Shivakumar, arrayed as accused Nos. 3, 1 and 2 respectively, sought quashing of the proceedings.

pp. 5–6 · ¶ 3–4

A coordinate Bench had already quashed the proceedings against accused No. 4 on substantially similar allegations arising from the same advertisement.

pp. 5–6 · ¶ 7–8

02Issues

i.1. Whether the criminal defamation proceedings against accused Nos. 1–3 could continue when a coordinate Bench had quashed proceedings against accused No. 4 on allegations arising from the same advertisement

pp. 7–8, 14–15 · ¶ 7–10

ii.2. Whether, on the material and allegations described in the complaint, the proceedings against these petitioners should be quashed in the exercise of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction

pp. 6–7, 11–14 · ¶ 4–8

03Law Applied

Sections 499 and 500 IPC govern criminal defamation; Explanation 2 to Section 499 recognises that an imputation concerning a company, association or collection of persons may amount to defamation.

pp. 9–11 · ¶ 7

Under S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, the allegedly defamed collection must be identifiable with sufficient precision, and the person bringing the complaint must be aggrieved by the imputation.

pp. 9–11 · ¶ 7

The High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC (invoked in the petitions under Section 528 BNSS) may be exercised to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal supplies illustrative categories for quashing, while Sajal Bose v. State of West Bengal and Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh address the applicable quashing principles.

pp. 11–14 · ¶ 8

The Court also relied on the principle that similarly situated co-accused facing materially similar allegations should not receive different treatment without a cogent basis, citing Sajal Bose and Susanta Kumar Dalei @ Susanta Kumar Dalai v. State of Odisha.

pp. 11–19 · ¶ 8–9

Provisions in the judgment · 8 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 482 Section 200 Section 199 Section 156 Section 155

Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 499 Section 500

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 Section 528

04Reasoning

The Court treated the coordinate Bench’s decision concerning accused No. 4 as materially relevant because the allegations against all the petitioners arose from the same advertisement and were substantially similar.

pp. 8–11 · ¶ 7

It noted that the earlier decision had found the advertisement, without the separately alleged tweet, insufficient to connect accused No. 4 to the imputation or to establish that the political party was the aggrieved entity; the alleged imputation instead concerned functionaries and government employees who were not before the Court.

pp. 8–11 · ¶ 7

Since the quashing of proceedings against accused No. 4 had attained finality and the Court found no distinguishing circumstance warranting different treatment of accused Nos. 1–3, it applied the parity principle and concluded that continuation of the proceedings against these petitioners was unjustified.

pp. 14–19 · ¶ 8–10