Karnataka HC Sets Aside ₹27.9 Lakh Electrocution Compensation For Man Who Lost Hand, Citing Disputed Liability

On 9 June 2015, Govindappa suffered electrical injuries near a transformer on private property, resulting in amputation of his left hand.

After earlier directions to consider his claim, BESCOM sanctioned ₹1,20,000 under an administrative compensation scheme.

Govindappa sought higher compensation under Article 226, relying on the Motor Vehicles Act compensation methodology.

The Single Judge awarded ₹27,88,925 with interest, subject to deduction of the amount already paid.

BESCOM appealed, disputing liability and quantum and arguing that the contested circumstances required a civil trial.

Under Rylands v. Fletcher, strict liability may arise where a dangerous thing escapes, subject to recognised exceptions; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India established absolute liability for enterprises engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities, without those exceptions.

In M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, the Supreme Court applied strict liability to an electricity undertaking, while recognising that the circumstances of an accident remain relevant.

In Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. v. Rekha (2026 INSC 847), the Supreme Court clarified that electricity undertakings are subject to strict, not absolute, liability; recognised exceptions may apply, disputed material facts may require evidence, and the Motor Vehicles Act multiplier method cannot be mechanically applied to electrocution claims.

Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. v. Sukamani Das and S.D.O. Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. v. Timudu Oram establish that electrocution claims involving material factual disputes ordinarily require adjudication before a competent civil court.

A payment under an administrative compensation scheme does not, without more, constitute an admission of tortious liability.

Criminal acquittal does not by itself determine civil liability, which is assessed under a different standard of proof.

Although the accident and Govindappa’s serious injuries were not disputed, the circumstances bearing on BESCOM’s liability—including how the accident occurred and the responsibility of the parties—remained contested.

Under Rekha, those questions could require evidence and could not properly be resolved through the writ proceedings.

The Single Judge’s reliance on the earlier Division Bench decision and its use of the Motor Vehicles Act methodology could not stand after the Supreme Court’s decision in Rekha.

Nor did the ₹1,20,000 administrative payment conclusively establish liability for the additional damages claimed; the officials’ criminal acquittal likewise did not settle civil liability.

Govindappa was left at liberty to pursue compensation before the competent civil court or other competent forum, with all contentions open; that forum must determine the claim independently and in accordance with law.

No order as to costs.