Labour Court cannot re-appreciate evidence to overturn misconduct findings after upholding the domestic inquiry's procedural fairness.

The Respondent was engaged as a daily-rated driver by the Petitioner (MTNL) in 1982.

On 09.01.1988, he was assigned a vehicle which was allegedly not parked back at the designated premises and was sighted the following day at Kosikalan, Delhi-Mathura Road, by a Vigilance Department official.

MTNL initiated a domestic inquiry, which concluded that the charges of unauthorized vehicle use were proved.

Consequently, the Respondent’s services were terminated on 01.08.1988.

The Industrial Tribunal, while holding that the domestic inquiry was fair and followed principles of natural justice, set aside the termination on the grounds that the Inquiry Officer’s findings were based on "assumptions" and lacked "reliable evidence".

The Tribunal ordered reinstatement without back wages.

MTNL challenged this Award via the present writ petition.

1. Whether the Labour Court, after holding the domestic inquiry to be fair and proper, was justified in interfering with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and setting aside the termination.

2. Whether the findings of the Inquiry Officer were perverse or based on "no evidence" so as to warrant interference under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.

3. Whether the impugned Award suffers from jurisdictional error or patent illegality warranting interference under Article 226.

The Court applied Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which grants Tribunals power to set aside discharge or dismissal, but noted this power must be exercised judiciously and not as a court of appeal.

It relied on *B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India*, establishing that judicial review is concerned with the manner of decision-making, not the correctness of the conclusion, provided there is "some evidence".

It further applied *Standard Chartered Bank v. R.C. Srivastava*, holding that Tribunals cannot re-appreciate evidence or apply the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard to domestic inquiries, which operate on "prepreponderance of probabilities".

Finally, it cited *General Manager (P), Canara Bank v. Ganganarasimhaiah* regarding the limited scope of interference when an inquiry is found to be procedurally fair.

The Court reasoned that once the Labour Court determined the inquiry was fair and compliant with natural justice, its jurisdiction to interfere with factual findings became extremely narrow.

The High Court found that the Labour Court erroneously acted as an appellate body by re-evaluating the "reliability" and "adequacy" of evidence regarding gate registers and witness testimonies.

The High Court noted that "perversity" only exists if a finding is based on *no* evidence; here, the Inquiry Officer had relied on gate entries and the unrebutted sighting of the vehicle.

The Court emphasized that strict rules of the Evidence Act do not apply to departmental proceedings and the non-examination of a specific witness (Shri A.K. Trikha) did not vitiate the inquiry since the Respondent failed to summon him in defense.

It held that the Labour Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 11A by substituting its own view for that of the Inquiry Officer.

The High Court set aside the Award dated 26.09.2005 and restored the termination order dated 01.08.1988.

However, it directed that wages already paid to the Respondent under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act during the litigation shall not be recovered.

The writ petition was allowed.