Landlord establishes ownership under Section 14(1)(e) by proving title superior to that of the tenant.

The Petitioner (tenant) filed a Revision Petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ("DRC Act") assailing the Order dated 06.07.2020 passed by the learned ACJ-cum-ARC (Central), Tis Hazari Courts, in Eviction Petition E-78036/2016, concerning premises bearing Municipal No. 1013, Ward No. 3, Katra Ghee, Tilak Bazar, Phatak Hafiz Khan, New Delhi.

The eviction proceedings were instituted by the Respondents claiming bona fide requirement under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.

The subject premises had been purchased by Sh. Brij Mohan and Sh. Suresh Kumar from the erstwhile owner vide registered sale deed (Ex. PW-1/1); upon their deaths, the premises devolved upon their legal heirs (Respondent Nos. 1 to 3), and one LR of Sh. Brij Mohan, Smt. Raj Dulari, sold her share to Respondent No. 4 vide registered Partition Deed.

The Petitioner admitted that his father was inducted as tenant in 1947–48 and that rent was paid until 2007.

Before the High Court, the Petitioner restricted his challenge to two grounds: (i) Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 were not landlords of the subject premises, the sale deed reflecting only Sh. Suresh Kumar's name, and Respondent No. 3 neither entered the witness box nor executed any Power of Attorney; and (ii) subsequent events — sale of two residential properties in 2012 and 2014 prior to institution of the petition, and acquisition of another residential property in 2017 during its pendency — demolished the Respondents' plea of bona fide requirement.

Notably, none of these subsequent events formed part of the Petitioner's leave to defend Application before the learned ARC.

1. Whether Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 had established their status as owners/landlords of the subject premises, with a title superior to that of the tenant, so as to maintain eviction proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.

2. Whether the alleged subsequent events, namely the sale of two residential properties (2012 and 2014) and acquisition of another residential property (2017), dislodged the Respondents' plea of bona fide requirement and warranted interference in the exercise of limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

The Court applied the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, which confers a supervisory and revisional jurisdiction upon the High Court that cannot be equated with appellate jurisdiction.

High Court's role is one of superintendence over the decision-making process, permitting interference only where there is an error apparent on the face of the record or absence of adjudication, and not a roving re-inquiry (relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua).

Under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, a landlord is required to establish only a title better than that of the tenant, not absolute ownership (relying on Shanti Sharma v. Ved Prabha and Rajendra Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. Leelawati & Ors.).

Under Section 2(e) of the DRC Act, legal representatives of deceased co-owners step into their shoes as landlords, and even a single co-owner may maintain eviction proceedings on the doctrine of agency (relying on M/s India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. v. Bhagabandel Agarwalla).

The learned ARC had examined the registered sale deed (Ex. PW-1/1), the partition deed (Mark 'A'), and the sale deed in favour of Respondent No. 4 (Mark 'B'), and relied upon the Petitioner's own admissions that his father was inducted as tenant and that rent was paid until 2007.

Since the law requires only a title superior to the tenant's — and additionally permits co-owners to sue for eviction on the doctrine of agency — the Court found no jurisdictional error, material irregularity, or perversity in the ARC's conclusion.

The Court refused to countenance the alleged subsequent events because they admittedly formed no part of the leave to defend Application, and no satisfactory explanation was furnished for the omission.

The suitability and relevance of the sold/acquired properties raised disputed questions of fact incapable of first-time examination in revision under Section 25B(8), and the events pleaded were not of such an exceptional character as to justify reopening findings.

The Court dismissed the Revision Petition as devoid of merit and holding that the Impugned Order dated 06.07.2020 suffered from no jurisdictional error, illegality, or material irregularity.