Landlord’s genuine need to establish his son’s business can justify eviction under UP tenancy law, Allahabad HC rules

The two connected petitions arose under the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 and concerned eviction proceedings under Section 21(2), particularly clause (m).

In Sandeep v. Vinod Kumar Chhabra, the tenant occupied Shop No. 97-B, Muzaffarnagar.

The landlord sought eviction on grounds including rent default, material alteration, termination of tenancy, and requirement of the premises for his son’s business/office.

The Rent Authority rejected the eviction application, but the Rent Tribunal allowed the landlord’s appeal and directed eviction.

In Keshav Bhalla v. Prescribed Authority, the petitioner occupied a shop in Farrukhabad, originally let to his father.

After his father’s death, he continued to operate a tempo-repair business from the premises.

The landlord sought eviction principally on the grounds of rent default and requirement of the shop for his unemployed son’s business.

The Rent Authority ordered eviction, and the Rent Tribunal affirmed that decision.

Both tenants challenged the orders under Article 227, contending that a requirement for the landlord’s son could not constitute the “requirement of the landlord” under Section 21(2)(m), and also disputing the findings on default, alternative accommodation, hardship and genuineness of requirement.

Whether the expression “required by landlord” in the first limb of Section 21(2)(m) of the 2021 Act is confined to the landlord’s own personal and physical occupation of the premises, or may include a genuine requirement for establishing or carrying on the business of the landlord’s son or another close family member?

Whether the words “for the purpose of its occupation by landlord” grammatically and substantively qualify both alternatives—premises required in their existing form or after demolition and new construction—or are confined to the latter alternative?

Whether the findings of the Rent Authorities and Rent Tribunals suffered from perversity, manifest illegality, jurisdictional error or lack of evidence warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution?

The Court applied Section 21(2)(m) of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021, which contemplates recovery where premises are required by the landlord either in their existing form or after demolition and new construction, with the latter limb referring to occupation by the landlord.

The Court held that the words “for the purpose of its occupation by landlord” are, in grammatical context, more naturally referable to the second contingency, although punctuation is only a subordinate aid to interpretation.

Relying principally on Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397, and the related authorities in Kailash Chand v. Dharam Dass, (2005) 5 SCC 375; Ajit Singh v. Jit Ram, (2008) 9 SCC 699; Mehmooda Gulshan v. Javaid Hussain Mungloo, (2017) 5 SCC 683; Dwarkaprasad v. Niranjan, (2003) 4 SCC 549; and Murlidhar Aggarwal v. Mahendra Pratap Kakan, 2025 INSC 564, the Court held that “own use” or “own occupation” need not invariably mean the landlord’s personal physical use.

A family member’s proposed use may constitute the landlord’s requirement where there is a genuine and legitimate nexus, assessed through the relationship, dependence, purpose of use, surrounding circumstances and genuineness of the claim.

The Court also applied Shyam Pal v. B.S. Enterprises, 2026 SCC OnLine All 172, for the principle that the 2021 Act must be interpreted according to its own language and scheme, without mechanically importing requirements such as “bona fide requirement” or comparative hardship from the repealed 1972 Act.

Under Article 227, interference is confined to jurisdictional error, manifest error of law, perversity, arbitrariness, or findings based on no evidence; the jurisdiction is supervisory, not appellate.

The Court distinguished between the identity of the proposed user and the legal character of the requirement.

Although the landlords’ sons were the intended users, that fact alone neither excluded the claims from Section 21(2)(m) nor automatically established them.

The competent authority had to determine whether the requirement could properly be regarded as the landlord’s own requirement, having regard to the familial relationship, the son’s proposed business, the circumstances giving rise to the claim, and the genuineness and legitimacy of the asserted need.

The Court further held that the comma introduced after “either in its existing form” and the disjunctive “or” supported treating the existing-form and demolition/reconstruction contingencies as grammatically distinct, with the phrase concerning occupation by the landlord more naturally attached to the latter limb.

Nevertheless, “required by landlord” in the first limb was not restricted to personal physical occupation because the Legislature had not expressly imposed that limitation.

In both cases, the requirement for the son had been pleaded before the Rent Authority, considered on the evidentiary record, and examined in appeal.

The petitioners failed to show that the findings were based on no evidence, ignored material circumstances, or were conclusions that no reasonable authority could have reached.

Allegations concerning alternative accommodation, comparative hardship and the tenants’ livelihood did not justify interference because such matters could not be converted into independent statutory conditions absent legislative incorporation in the 2021 Act.

A genuine requirement for establishing or carrying on the business of an immediate family member, including a son, may fall within “required by landlord” where a legitimate nexus with the landlord’s circumstances and interests is established; however, family relationship alone is insufficient.

The words “for the purpose of its occupation by landlord” were held more naturally referable to the demolition-and-new-construction limb, while the first limb remained independently governed by the expression “required by landlord”.

Both petitions under Article 227 were dismissed, as no perversity, jurisdictional error or manifest illegality was demonstrated in the eviction orders.

At the tenants’ request, six months’ time was granted to vacate, subject to filing undertakings within two weeks, depositing arrears, vacating and handing over possession by 23 March 2027, and paying ₹4,000 per month as use and occupation charges from October 2026 until delivery of possession.

Non-compliance would automatically terminate the protection and permit enforcement of the eviction orders.