Lawyer’s illness alone cannot condone prolonged delay absent explanation for the entire limitation period.

The respondents instituted Title Suit No. 10 of 2022 seeking, inter alia, declaration of right, title and interest over land known as Wahlakhiat.

In the connected injunction proceedings, the Trial Court directed the parties to maintain status quo by order dated 09.06.2023.

Thereafter, on allegations that the respondents had violated the status quo order, the Trial Court passed further orders dated 30.01.2024 and 09.02.2024 directing them to maintain status quo and show cause.

The respondents filed Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 9 of 2024 on 03.09.2024 challenging the order dated 30.01.2024, along with an application seeking condonation of 215 days’ delay.

They attributed the delay principally to the illness of their advocate.

The Appellate Court condoned the delay by order dated 10.11.2025, relying on the advocate’s illness and the principle that a litigant should not suffer for the fault of counsel.

The petitioners challenged that order in the present revision.

The High Court noted that the respondents had participated in the Trial Court proceedings after 30.01.2024, including through counsel, and that a list of witnesses had been filed under the appointed advocate’s signature on 07.06.2024.

Whether the respondents had established “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condoning the entire delay of 215 days in filing the appeal, particularly when the delay was attributed to the illness or inaction of their advocate.

Whether the Appellate Court acted improperly in condoning the delay without scrutinising the medical material, examining the Trial Court record, or requiring an explanation for the entire period from the commencement of limitation until the actual filing of the appeal.

Whether the impugned order suffered from such legal infirmity as to warrant interference in civil revision.

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, under which delay may be condoned only upon demonstration of “sufficient cause” for the entire period of delay, including both the prescribed limitation period and the period thereafter until actual filing, as stated in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969.

The Court held, relying on Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash, (2024) 12 SCC 336, that negligence or inability of counsel, by itself, cannot justify condonation of long and inordinate delay because litigants must remain vigilant regarding their rights and proceedings.

It distinguished the broad, justice-oriented approach in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, as applicable to a short delay of four days, and relied on Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Pvt. Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 185, for the principle that Rafiq v. Munshilal, (1981) 2 SCC 788, does not establish an absolute rule that a party is never to suffer for counsel’s lapse.

Shivamma further requires stricter scrutiny as the length of delay increases and rejects condonation where gross negligence, deliberate inaction or casual indifference is apparent.

The High Court held that the respondents knew, or ought to have known, of the order dated 30.01.2024 because they continued participating in the Trial Court proceedings from 16.02.2024 onwards and filed a witness list on 07.06.2024.

Their application did not explain why the appeal was not filed within the prescribed limitation period, nor did it account for the entire 215-day delay up to 03.09.2024.

Although medical prescriptions dated 19.02.2024, 16.03.2024 and 27.07.2024 were produced, there was no material establishing that the advocate was bedridden or wholly incapacitated during the relevant period.

The Appellate Court failed to scrutinise the medical evidence or the Trial Court record and mechanically accepted the advocate-illness explanation.

In view of the respondents’ continued participation in the proceedings, their failure to promptly challenge orders passed in proceedings initiated by them, and the absence of an explanation for the complete period of delay, the High Court characterised the conduct as gross negligence, deliberate inaction and casual indifference.

The Appellate Court’s order dated 10.11.2025 in Misc. Case No. 136 of 2024 was set aside and quashed, and Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 9 of 2024 pending before the Judge, District Council Court, Shillong was also quashed.

The civil revision petition was accordingly allowed.