Leave to produce a photocopy requires scrutiny of pleadings, relevance, and the original’s evidentiary status.

The plaintiffs challenged an order allowing the defendants’ application under Order VIII Rule 1-A CPC to produce and mark a xerox copy of a document, on the ground that the original had become partially mutilated.

The defendants relied on a deed said in their written statement to be dated 11.10.1973 as the source of their ancestor’s title, but the xerox copy bore the date 15.10.1973.

Although the trial court noted that the original was on the record, it did not determine whether it had been tendered or marked in evidence, or examine the circumstances in which the xerox copy was being produced.

The plaintiffs sought relief under Article 227 of the Constitution.

1. Whether the trial court properly allowed the defendants to produce and mark the xerox copy without examining its relevance to the pleadings and issues, the date discrepancy, and the evidentiary status of the original.

2. Whether the impugned order should be set aside and the application restored for fresh consideration.

Order VIII Rule 1-A CPC governs a party’s production of documents relied upon in support of its case.

In deciding an application for leave to produce a document at a belated stage, the court must consider the parties’ pleadings, the nature of the controversy, the issues for determination, and the document’s relevance.

Where a copy is sought to be relied upon in substitution for or in addition to an original on the record, the court must also ascertain the original’s evidentiary status and the circumstances in which the copy is produced.

The deed was central to the defendants’ pleaded claim of title, making the document’s relevance material to the application.

The discrepancy between the date pleaded and the date on the xerox copy required consideration, as did whether the original had already been tendered or marked and why the copy was being relied upon.

Because the trial court allowed the application based principally on the original’s partial mutilation without addressing these matters, its order was cryptic and procedurally deficient.

It restored the application to the trial court for fresh consideration, directing the court to consider the pleadings, issues, document relied upon in the written statement, and status of the original.

All contentions were left open, and the trial court was directed to decide the application independently of the High Court’s observations.