Letters Patent Appeal is Not Maintainable Against Single Judge Orders Restoring or Dismissing First Appeals for Default

In brief

The question

1. Whether Section 100-A of the CPC imposes a bar on filing a Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench against an order passed by a Single Judge dismissing a first appeal for default?

The court held

The Court held that the Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable.

It also directed

It answered Issue 1 by ruling that Section 100-A CPC bars LPAs against orders dismissing a first appeal for default.

And Issue 2 by ruling that no LPA lies against an order rejecting a restoration petition of such a first appeal.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as maintainable.

01Facts

The Appellant (SBI) filed a Money Suit for recovery of approximately ₹1.79 Crores, which was dismissed by the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) on 05.01.2018.

¶ 4(i)

The Appellant preferred a First Appeal (F.A. No. 121 of 2018) before a Single Judge of the Jharkhand High Court.

¶ 4(ii)

On 24.06.2020, the Single Judge passed a peremptory order directing the Appellant to file requisites for service of notice within four weeks.

¶ 4(ii)

Due to non-compliance, the First Appeal was dismissed for default on 22.07.2020.

¶ 4(iii)

The Appellant's subsequent restoration petition (C.M.P. No. 65 of 2021) was dismissed by the Single Judge on 15.03.2024, on the grounds that the counsel should have obtained the order copy despite alleged virtual hearing network issues.

¶ 4(iv-v)

The Appellant then filed this Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) before a Division Bench.

¶ 1

02Issues

i.1. Whether Section 100-A of the CPC imposes a bar on filing a Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench against an order passed by a Single Judge dismissing a first appeal for default?

¶ 7(i)

ii.2. Whether a Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against an order passed in a Civil Miscellaneous Petition filed for restoration of a first appeal which was dismissed for default by a Single Judge?

¶ 7(ii)

03Law Applied

The Court primarily applied Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), which contains a non-obstante clause barring further appeals from a judgment or decree of a Single Judge in an appeal from an original/appellate decree or order.

¶ 10-11

It relied on the principle of "purposive construction" as articulated in Mohd. Saud v. Dr. (Maj.) Sk. Mahfooz (2010) 13 SCC 517, which held that Section 100-A aims to curtail the number of appeals even if the order is interlocutory or does not technically constitute a "decree".

¶ 14

It further cited Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India (2003) 1 SCC 49, upholding the validity of the bar to minimize judicial workload.

¶ 13

And Metro Tyres Ltd. v. Satpal Singh Bhandari, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3681, regarding the non-maintainability of LPAs against restoration rejections.

¶ 24-25

Provisions in the judgment · 5

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 100-A

Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 Section 15Section 18Section 40

Letters Patent Section 10

04Reasoning

The Court rejected the Appellant's contention that the words "heard and decided" in Section 100-A necessitate a hearing on merits for the bar to apply.

¶ 21

Applying purposive interpretation, the Court reasoned that the legislative intent was to minimize delays and prevent multiple tiers of intra-court scrutiny.

¶ 20, 23

It noted that an "opportunity of hearing provided" is sufficient to satisfy the "heard" requirement; a party cannot circumvent the statutory bar by allowing an appeal to be dismissed for default and then appealing the refusal of restoration.

¶ 25, 29

The Court concluded that if an LPA is barred against the final decision of the Single Judge in a first appeal, it must logically be barred against ancillary orders like a dismissal for default or a refusal to restore, otherwise, negligent litigants would receive a premium for their callousness.

¶ 32-33