Letters Patent benches cannot overturn a writ court’s decision merely because they take a different view, Supreme Court rules

The appellant, a Deputy Registrar of Periyar University, was removed from service after a One-man Commission found certain charges proved, including that he influenced the grant of affiliation to a college managed by his wife, owned a house purchased without University permission, and possessed a car without obtaining the requisite permission

The writ court set aside the removal, holding that the findings were unsupported by evidence and based on conjecture.

On the University’s appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the Division Bench reappraised the inquiry materials, reversed the writ court, and restored the removal order.

Saravanan appealed to the Supreme Court.

1. Whether the writ court was entitled under Article 226 to interfere with the disciplinary findings as perverse and unsupported by evidence

2. Whether a Letters Patent Bench may reverse a writ court’s decision merely because it takes a different view of the facts, and what limits govern its appellate interference

Article 226 empowers the High Court to issue certiorari for jurisdictional error, breach of natural justice, or a finding based on no evidence; under Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, a no-evidence finding is an error of law, although the writ court does not ordinarily reappreciate evidence as an appellate court.

Disciplinary findings must rest on evidence and a preponderance of probabilities; conjecture and surmise alone cannot establish misconduct.

The Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, including Rule 17(g), and Chapter VIII, Clause 13 of the University Statutes governed the inquiry and appointment of an inquiry authority.

Under Clause 15 of the Madras Letters Patent, a Division Bench may review questions of fact and law, but should give due weight to the writ court’s exercise of discretion and interfere only on cogent grounds where the findings are demonstrably erroneous or the mistake is glaring—not merely because it would reach a different conclusion.

The Supreme Court held that the writ court had not impermissibly reassessed the evidence; it had identified the absence of evidentiary support for the Commission’s findings.

The Commission inferred that Saravanan “could have” influenced the affiliation decision based on his position, treated loan repayments and failure to produce title documents as proof of ownership of the house, and found misconduct in the car purchase for want of permission, without sufficient evidence establishing the charged misconduct.

Those findings were therefore susceptible to review under Article 226 as perverse and based on conjecture.

Although the Letters Patent Bench had authority to examine facts, it reversed the writ court by reappraising the materials and drawing its own inferences, without identifying a cogent or glaring error in the writ court’s reasoning.

The appeal was allowed; the Division Bench’s judgment was set aside and the writ court’s decision in W.P. No. 23936 of 2013 was restored.

No order as to costs was made.