Licensee holds no legal right to permanent occupation after termination of implied or oral license.

The appellant, claiming to be a registered Trade Union, challenged an order dated 10.12.2025 passed by a Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court which dismissed their writ petition.

The appellant sought to quash a communication dated 19.11.2025 from the Surat Municipal Corporation (SMC) directing them to vacate Room No. 4 of the Surat Nagarpalika Main Office.

The appellant argued that they were shifted to the premises in 2015 by the Corporation and were in legal possession.

However, the court noted discrepancies in the registration name of the Union.

The court found that the appellant paid no rent or charges for the occupation.

1. Whether the appellant held a permanent legal right to occupy the municipal premises based on a 2015 shifting order.

2. Whether the Corporation was required to follow a specific "due process of law" beyond the issuance of a termination notice to evict a licensee paying no rent.

The court applied the principles of the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 regarding the legal status of unions.

It primarily relied on the law of licenses, distinguishing between a permanent leasehold right and a permissive occupation (oral license).

The court held that a licensee occupies property at the pleasure of the licensor, and such license stands terminated upon the issuance of a clear notice to vacate.

The Court observed that the appellant’s reliance on the communication dated 26.02.2015 was misplaced, as that document merely directed a "shifting" for "temporary arrangement" and did not constitute a permanent allotment.

Since the appellant failed to produce an allotment letter or evidence of paying rent/charges, the Court categorized their status as a "licensee" holding oral permission.

The Court reasoned that any permissive right to occupy stood legally terminated upon the issuance of the notice dated 12.11.2025.

Consequently, the appellant could not claim a fundamental or legal right under Part III of the Constitution to remain in possession against the wishes of the municipal body.

It held that the appellant had no legal right to occupy the premises following the termination of the oral license.

The Court noted that the appellant had already been removed from the premises and directed that any request for alternative space must be made through a proper representation to the Corporation.

The civil application for stay was disposed of as it did not survive.