Licensee holds no right to possession or notice after expiry of license term by efflux of time.

The Appellant, a society registered in 1997, challenged an order passed by a learned Single Judge which dismissed its writ petition against a vacation notice dated 07.05.2026 issued by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD).

The MCD directed the Appellant to vacate the Keshopur Cremation Ground within seven days, as the site had been allotted to another foundation (Guru Nanak Sewa Foundation) under a new policy for the adoption and maintenance of cremation grounds.

The Appellant claimed it had managed the grounds for 32 years and relied on a 2017 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) executed between the "Shamshan Bhoomi Sudhar Samiti" (Samiti) and the MCD.

The Appellant contended it was the managing committee of said Samiti and had incurred substantial expenses for development.

1. Whether the Appellant has the locus standi to maintain the appeal given that the 2017 MoU was executed by a different legal entity (the Samiti).

2. Whether a licensee has a legal right to continue possession of a premises after the expiry of the license term by efflux of time.

An MOU created for a fixed term constitutes a license, which terminates upon the expiry of its term.

An independent registered society is a distinct legal entity, and a third party (even claiming to be a managing committee) cannot litigate on its behalf without establishing a direct legal right.

Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding procedural exemptions.

The Court first determined that the Appellant lacked standing because the 2017 MoU was executed by the "Shamshan Bhoomi Sudhar Samiti," an independent registered society, and not the Appellant itself.

The Court analyzed Clause 2 of the 2017 MoU, noting it granted a license for one year, extendable by two years (totaling three years), which effectively expired in 2024.

The Court reasoned that once the license stood exhausted by efflux of time, the status of the occupant was merely that of a licensee whose term had ended. Consequently, the MCD was not required to issue a show-cause notice to take back possession.

The Court further observed that neither the long duration of management (32 years) nor the expenditure incurred on the property conferred any independent legal title or right to stay in possession beyond the contractual period.

(2) the MCD was legally entitled to seek eviction as the license granted under the 2017 MoU had expired by efflux of time.

The Court found no infirmity in the Single Judge’s order and directed no order as to costs.