Life convict released after 24 years as Supreme Court applies ‘Principle of Parity’ with co-accused whose death sentence was reduced to 20 years.

The applicant, Sudesh Pal, along with co-accused Madan and Ishwar, was convicted by the Sessions Court in 2015 under Section 302/149 of the IPC for a 2003 incident. The applicant and Madan were sentenced to death.

On appeal, the Allahabad High Court commuted the applicant's death sentence to life imprisonment while upholding Madan’s death penalty.

In 2023, the Supreme Court confirmed the applicant's life sentence but modified Madan’s death penalty to a fixed term of 20 years without remission. Madan was consequently released.

The applicant filed this Miscellaneous Application seeking modification of his life sentence to 20 years on the grounds of parity, old age, and having already completed 24 years of incarceration with remission.

1. Whether the principle of parity in sentencing applies to an applicant whose sentence was already commuted to life by the High Court, when a co-accused (originally sentenced to death) subsequently received a fixed-term sentence of 20 years from the Supreme Court.

2. Whether the applicant is entitled to immediate release based on his period of incarceration exceeding the fixed term granted to the co-accused.

The Court primarily applied the Principle of Parity in sentencing.

It operated under the framework of Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, regarding punishment for murder committed in prosecution of common object.

The court exercised its discretionary power to modify sentences to a "fixed term" (e.g., twenty years) to serve the ends of justice while considering factors such as conduct, duration of incarceration, and the comparative culpability/sentencing of co-accused.

The Court analyzed the discrepancy between the sentences of the two primary accused. It noted that while the applicant’s sentence had been commuted to life earlier by the High Court, the co-accused Madan (who was initially viewed more severely by the High Court) eventually received a more favorable specific term of 20 years from the Supreme Court.

The State argued against parity, claiming Madan’s relief was based on a specific medical condition not present in the applicant’s case.

However, the Court reasoned that since the co-accused—who was on a higher pedestal of punishment (death)—had his sentence restricted to 20 years and was released, the applicant (who was on a lower pedestal of life imprisonment) must also have his sentence restricted to the same period of 20 years to maintain judicial consistency and fairness.

Since the applicant had already completed 24 years of imprisonment with remission, the Court allowed the Miscellaneous Application and ordered his immediate release.