Limitation-barred specific performance does not, by itself, defeat a Section 53-A possession defence.

The respondent-landlord sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, alleging that he and his son required the tenanted shop to start a confectionery business.

The petitioner-tenant, who had been inducted in 1987, asserted that an Agreement to Sell dated 18 August 2000 had been executed in his favour, that he had paid consideration, and that his possession thereafter was protected by Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“TP Act”).

His suit for specific performance was dismissed as time-barred, and subsequent challenges were unsuccessful.

The Rent Controller dismissed his application for leave to defend, treating the agreement and specific-performance proceedings as insufficient to raise a triable issue.

The tenant challenged that order under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act

1. Whether dismissal of the suit for specific performance as time-barred, by itself, justified rejecting the tenant’s separate defence under Section 53-A of the TP Act

2. Whether the Rent Controller’s failure to examine that defence warranted interference in revision under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act

Section 53-A of the TP Act may be invoked as a defence to protect possession even where a suit for specific performance is barred by limitation; limitation generally bars the remedy of an action, not a defence, absent a statutory provision to that effect.

The defence is available only if the statutory requirements are met, including a written contract for consideration signed by the transferor, ascertainable terms, possession taken in part-performance, an act in furtherance of the contract, and performance or willingness to perform the transferee’s obligations (*Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi v. Prahlad Bairouva Suryavanshi*, 2002 (3) SCC 676)

Under *H.K. Sharma v. Ram Lal*, (2019) 4 SCC 153, the agreement’s terms must be examined to determine whether the requirements of Section 53-A are met

Revision under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory, not appellate; the High Court ordinarily does not reappreciate evidence, but may interfere where the decision-making process is materially flawed or a material plea has not been considered (*Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua*, (2022) 6 SCC 30)

In a leave-to-defend application under Section 25-B, a material defence which, if established, could disentitle the landlord to eviction may raise a triable issue

The Rent Controller rejected the Section 53-A plea as insignificant because the tenant’s specific-performance suit had failed, without independently considering whether the tenant could rely on Section 53-A as a defence or whether its statutory conditions were satisfied

The High Court held that limitation alone could not dispose of that distinct defence.

The respondent’s contention that the agreement did not record delivery of possession—and the relevance of *H.K. Sharma*—required examination of the agreement, the material on record and the applicable law.

The High Court expressed no view on whether Section 53-A ultimately applied; it held only that the material plea required consideration by the Rent Controller.

That omission amounted to an infirmity in the decision-making process warranting revisional interference

It left the merits of that plea open and disposed of the revision and pending applications; the matter was directed to be listed before the Rent Controller on 29 October 2026