Limitation for compassionate appointment commences from the date of judicial declaration of civil death.

The petitioner’s father, a Peon in the State Public Works Department, went missing on 01.10.1996

On 29.07.2006, the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Karnprayag, Chamoli, officially declared his civil death

At that time, the petitioner was approximately 14 years old, and his mother requested the Department to keep the claim for compassionate appointment alive until he attained majority

Following his majority, the petitioner applied for compassionate appointment on 05.09.2011

The Personnel Department rejected the claim via a file noting, asserting that the five-year limitation period for the application should have been calculated from 02.10.2003 (seven years after the date of disappearance) rather than the date of the judicial declaration

The petitioner challenged this noting in the present writ petition.

The Court primarily applied the Dying in Harness Rules, 1974, specifically Rule 2(b), which governs the eligibility and procedural requirements (including financial status affidavits) for compassionate appointments

The Court also applied the legal principle that in matters of missing persons, the date of a competent court's judgment declaring civil death serves as the definitive "date of death" for the purpose of calculating statutory limitation periods

Furthermore, the Court exercised the principle of equity against "hyper-technical" administrative views that defeat the remedial purpose of compassionate appointment schemes

The Court rejected the Personnel Department's contention that the limitation period commenced on 02.10.2003 (seven years post-disappearance).

It reasoned that the date of the judgment rendered by the Civil Judge (29.07.2006) must be treated as the starting point for the five-year period

Based on this calculation, the limitation expired on 28.07.2011

Although the petitioner applied on 05.09.2011—resulting in a delay of less than two months—the Court found the State’s refusal to grant an exemption to be "hyper-technical" and "erroneous"

The Court emphasized that given the peculiar facts, the State should have exercised its power to condone the minor delay rather than taking an unsustainable legal stance

Consequently, the decision of the Additional Secretary, Department of Appointment Personnel, was quashed

The Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction to the State Government to re-examine the petitioner’s claim for compassionate appointment in light of the Court's observations

This is subject to the petitioner furnishing a fresh affidavit regarding the family's current financial status under Rule 2(b) of the 1974 Rules within ten days; the State must pass a final order within ten weeks thereafter