Limitation for execution of decree commences from the date of final appellate decree under the doctrine of merger.

The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 filed an eviction suit in 1979 against Narayan Singh. After Narayan Singh's death, his wife and four sons (respondents 2-5) were impleaded. The Trial Court decreed the suit on 21.03.2001.

The First Appellate Court modified the decree on 21.07.2010. A second appeal to the High Court was dismissed on 31.05.2024, and the Supreme Court dismissed the SLP on 09.12.2024.

When the decree-holder filed for execution on 27.05.2022, the petitioner (daughter of the original tenant) filed objections under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC, claiming the execution was time-barred (commencing from the 2001 decree) and that she was a necessary party.

The Executing Court and the Appellate Rent Tribunal rejected her stay application on 20.02.2026. The petitioner challenged this via the present writ petition.

1. Whether the execution of the decree is barred by limitation under the principle that limitation runs from the date of the original decree (21.03.2001) or the appellate decree.

2. Whether the petitioner, as a daughter of the original tenant, is a necessary party or if a decree against other legal heirs (joint tenants) is executable against her.

Doctrine of Merger, which stipulates that there cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subject matter; thus, an inferior court's decree merges into the superior court's decree whether affirmed, modified, or reversed (Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala; Surinder Pal Soni v. Sohan Lal).

Principle that an appeal is a continuation of the suit, and limitation for execution under Article 136 of the Limitation Act resets upon the disposal of the appeal (Gajanan v. Prahlad, 2024).

Principle that successors of a tenant hold property as joint tenants, and a decree against one is executable against all (Smt. Chhaya Sethi v. Jitnendra Bohra).

Applying the doctrine of merger, it held that the 2001 trial court decree was subsumed by the 2010 appellate decree, which attained finality only after the High Court (2024) and Supreme Court (2024) dismissed further challenges.

Citing Gajanan v. Prahlad, the Court clarified that even if no stay was granted during the appeal (Order 41 Rule 5 CPC), the disposal of the appeal provides a "fresh starting point" for limitation. Consequently, the 2022 execution filing was within time.

The Court found that as a legal heir of the original tenant, she was a "joint tenant" rather than a "co-tenant"; therefore, the decree obtained against her brothers was validly executable against her interest. The Court also noted the petitioner's delayed intervention and previous failed attempts to implead herself in the second appeal.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the Appellate Rent Tribunal’s order dated 20.02.2026. Interference under Article 227 was declined as there was no jurisdictional error or perversity. All pending applications were disposed of.