Limitation for seeking a reference begins upon actual or constructive knowledge of the award.

The appellants’ land at Village Rambhoda was acquired for the Vatrak Jalagar Yojna during 1973–1974, and the Land Acquisition Officer made an award on 16 September 1975.

The original claimant filed objections seeking a reference under the Land Acquisition Act on 30 November 1988, approximately 4,833 days after the award. The reference was forwarded to the Reference Court only in 2024, after approximately 12,942 days.

The Additional Senior Civil Judge, Bayad, dismissed Land Reference Case No. 190 of 2024 on 1 October 2024 as time-barred.

The claimants challenged that dismissal before the High Court, relying on a coordinate Bench decision which had remanded a similar matter for adjudication on merits.

Whether the reference could be dismissed as time-barred solely by reckoning limitation from the date of the award when the record did not establish that notice or the essential contents of the award had been communicated to the claimants under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Whether, in the absence of proof of communication of the award, the reference ought to be restored and remanded for adjudication on merits, subject to appropriate directions regarding interest.

The Court applied Sections 12(2) and 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 12(2) obliges the Collector to give immediate notice of the award, including its essential contents, to interested persons who were not present when the award was made; the limitation for seeking a reference under Section 18 begins only upon actual or constructive knowledge of the award and its essential contents.

Relying on Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500, the Court held that an award is effectively made, for limitation purposes, when communicated or otherwise known to the affected party, rather than merely when signed or filed by the Collector.

It also relied on State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum, AIR 1963 SC 1604, and the decisions in Rajat Hirabhai Motibhai v. Deputy Collector and Heirs of deceased Aher Naran Maiya Bhupat Naranbhai, holding that mere knowledge of the existence of an award is insufficient; knowledge must relate to its essential contents.

Further, Premji Nathu was relied upon for the principle that a copy of the award should accompany the Section 12(2) notice to enable the landowner to effectively exercise the right of reference.

The High Court found that the record did not show issuance or receipt of any notice communicating the award or its essential contents to the claimants.

Applying the statutory obligation under Section 12(2) and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of limitation under Section 18, the Court held that the claimants’ objection could not be treated as barred merely because it was filed long after the date on which the award was formally passed.

Dismissing the reference on limitation without first determining whether the award had been communicated would unjustly defeat the claimants’ statutory right to seek determination of fair compensation, particularly where the acquisition was compulsory.

However, to balance equities arising from the substantial delay, the Court directed that the claimants would not receive interest on any enhanced compensation for the period during which they had not pursued their objection—namely, from 16 September 1975 to 30 November 1988.

The High Court quashed and set aside the Reference Court’s order dated 1 October 2024 and restored the original reference case to its file for fresh adjudication on merits.

The claimants were held disentitled to interest on any enhanced compensation for the period from 16 September 1975, the date of the award, to 30 November 1988, the date of filing objections.

One appellant was directed to file an affidavit confirming this undertaking, and the Registry was directed to place it on record.