Limitation for usufructuary mortgage redemption accrues only upon tender or payment of mortgage debt, not execution.

In 1978, Jagdish Prasad (predecessor of the respondents) executed a usufructuary mortgage of house No. 333 in Bareilly in favor of the petitioners for a debt of Rs. 15,000/-.

The deed stipulated a four-year period, with possession handed to the petitioners and rent to be adjusted against interest.

Jagdish Prasad died in 2015. On 30.12.2015, the respondents (heirs) tendered the principal amount via Bank Pay Order and demanded redemption, which the petitioners refused. The respondents filed a suit for redemption and possession in 2016.

The petitioners moved an application under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C., arguing the suit was barred by limitation as the 30-year period under Article 61 of the Limitation Act expired in 2012 (counting from the end of the four-year mortgage term in 1982). The trial court and revisional court rejected this application.

Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act (TPA), which grants a statutory right of redemption unless extinguished by act of parties or court decree.

Section 62 of the TPA, which governs the right of a usufructuary mortgagor to recover possession upon payment of the mortgage money.

Article 61(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes 30 years for redemption starting when the right to recover possession "accrues".

Larger Bench precedent in Singh Ram (D) Thr. L.Rs. v. Sheo Ram and others (2014), which held that in usufructuary mortgages, the right to recover possession accrues only when the money is paid or tendered, effectively overruling previous views in Prabhakaran v. M. Azhagiripillai and Sampuran Singh v. Niranjan Kaur.

The court reasoned that a usufructuary mortgage is distinct because the mortgagee enjoys the usufruct in lieu of interest, and the mortgagor does not typically incur personal liability.

Applying the doctrine "once a mortgage, always a mortgage," the court noted that the right to redeem is a statutory right inseparable from the mortgage itself.

The court rejected the petitioners' argument that the four-year term in the deed triggered the limitation clock; instead, it held that such a term merely restricts the mortgagor from suing during that period.

Following the Singh Ram mandate, the court found that for usufructuary mortgages, the limitation period under Article 61 only begins when the mortgagor tenders the debt. Since the respondents first tendered the amount on 30.12.2015, the "right to recover" accrued on that date.

Consequently, because the tender occurred on 30.12.2015 and the suit was filed on 03.03.2016, the suit was well within the 30-year limitation period. The court affirmed the lower courts' orders, dismissed the writ petition, and discharged any interim orders.