Limitation under Section 468 CrPC is reckoned from the date of filing the complaint, not taking cognizance.

On 09.05.2011, an altercation occurred between the appellant and Respondent No. 2 (an advocate) at the Moti Nagar court premises, leading to cross-FIRs.

FIR No. 121/2011 was registered by the appellant for offences under Sections 323 and 341 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

The Investigating Officer filed the charge-sheet on 29.05.2012, which was one year and 20 days after the date of the incident.

The Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.PC.

Respondent No. 2 sought quashing of the FIR, arguing that the cognizance was barred by the one-year limitation period prescribed under Section 468(2)(b) Cr.PC for offences punishable with imprisonment up to one year.

The High Court of Delhi allowed the petition and quashed the FIR on 30.01.2025, holding that the bar under Section 468 Cr.PC was absolute as the charge-sheet was filed beyond one year.

Section 468 of the Cr.PC, which bars courts from taking cognizance of certain offences after the expiry of the limitation period.

The Constitution Bench precedent in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases (2014) 2 SCC 62, which established that the date of filing the complaint or initiating prosecution is the relevant date for limitation, not the date of cognizance.

The legal maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit (the act of the court shall prejudice no one).

The legal maxim nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi (crime never dies).

Sections 469 (commencement of limitation), 470 (exclusion of time), and 473 (extension of period in the interest of justice) of the Cr.PC.

The Court observed that "taking cognizance" is a judicial act involving the application of mind by a Magistrate, a process subject to systemic or personal delays beyond the control of the complainant or prosecuting agency.

Relying on Sarah Mathew, the Court reasoned that interpreting Section 468 to mean the date of cognizance would unjustly penalize a diligent complainant for judicial delays, rendering the provision potentially unconstitutional.

The Court rejected the respondent's attempt to distinguish between a "complaint" (under Section 2(d)) and a "police report" (under Section 2(r)), clarifying that the principle applies to the "initiation of criminal proceedings," whether via FIR or private complaint.

The Court further emphasized that the High Court's reliance on the date of filing the charge-sheet/cognizance was a fundamental error, as the FIR (initiation of proceedings) was registered on the very day of the incident, well within the limitation period.

The Court criticized the practice of advocates re-litigating settled law established by Constitution Benches, noting that respecting binding precedents is a professional duty.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court’s order dated 30.01.2025.

Since the FIR was lodged on the date of the incident (09.05.2011), the proceedings were within limitation.

The Court directed the trial to proceed expeditiously in accordance with the law.