Lis pendens does not preclude injunctions restraining alienation to prevent multiplicity of proceedings.

The original plaintiff, since deceased and represented by her legal representatives, brought O.S. No. 238/2015 seeking a declaration of ownership and permanent injunction over three properties.

She relied on a partition deed dated 4 December 1963, claiming that the properties had come to her father; the defendants claimed title under registered sale deeds dated 19 September 1981 and 4 June 2001.

The trial court initially restrained the defendants from alienating the properties or creating third-party interests. The defendants’ appeal was allowed, and that restraint was set aside.

In the petition under Article 227, the petitioners stated that the defendants had subsequently sold the property by a deed dated 17 March 2026 and sought to implead the purchaser.

1. Whether the First Appellate Court was justified in setting aside the trial court’s interim order restraining alienation and creation of third-party interests in the suit properties

2. Whether the subsequent sale and the petitioners’ asserted interest in the properties warranted interference under Article 227

Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 embodies the doctrine of lis pendens: a transfer of property during the pendency of litigation is subject to the rights declared by the decree in that litigation.

The Court also applied the interim-protection principle that a court may preserve the subject matter of a suit pending determination of the parties’ rights; the possibility that a transferee would be bound by the eventual decree does not, by itself, make a restraint against alienation unjustified where such transfers could cause multiplicity of proceedings.

The plaintiff’s claim that she was a Class-I heir entitled to a share in properties said to have come to her father through his ancestors remained undecided in the suit.

The trial court’s order merely prevented alienation or creation of third-party interests and did not restrict the defendants’ enjoyment of the properties.

Although the First Appellate Court relied on Section 52 and reasoned that a purchaser would be bound by the eventual decree, the High Court held that this did not adequately account for the risk of multiple proceedings or the need to preserve the properties until the parties’ rights were determined.

The subsequent sale further supported interference with the appellate order.

It restored the trial court’s restraint against alienation or creation of third-party interests in the suit properties.

The petitioners were permitted to bring the purchaser on record before the trial court in accordance with law, and their impleadment application in the writ proceedings was disposed of.