LOC cannot be sustained if subject has consistently cooperated, returned from foreign travel, and poses no flight risk.

The petitioner, Sameer Gaur, a former Director and Joint Managing Director of Jaypee Infratech Limited (JIL), sought the quashing of a Look Out Circular (LOC) issued by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) in relation to investigations into Jaiprakash Associates Limited (JAL) and JIL

The petitioner resigned from his executive roles in 2016 and currently serves as an Advisor at M/s Kram Infracon Private Limited

The petitioner contended that he has consistently cooperated with the SFIO, appeared for statements, and provided requested information

Furthermore, LOCs against three of his family members involved in the same investigation had already been set aside by previous High Court orders

While the petition was pending, the Court had granted him permission to travel abroad on two occasions, both of which he complied with by returning to India

The Court primarily applied Article 21 of the Constitution, establishing that the right to travel abroad is a fundamental facet of personal liberty

It relied on Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, affirming that travel makes liberty worthwhile

The Court integrated principles from Ritu Singhal v. Bureau of Immigration, which distilled governing rules for LOCs: an LOC is a "measure of last resort" reserved for cognizable offences where an accused is deliberately evading arrest; it cannot be used as a routine tool for debt recovery or issued merely based on a person’s status as a director or family member

Furthermore, the power to issue LOCs for "economic interests of India" must be narrowly construed and reserved for grave threats to the national economy

The Court observed that the respondents failed to place any material demonstrating that the petitioner posed a flight risk, noting his substantial assets and family ties in India

Applying the Ritu Singhal principles, the Court found that guilt is personal and not vicarious; therefore, the petitioner's status as a former director did not justify the restriction without specific evidence of wrongdoing

The Court highlighted the petitioner’s history of cooperation with the SFIO and his compliance with previous court-ordered travel conditions as evidence that the purpose of the LOC had been sufficiently served

The Court reasoned that where a subject has not evaded summons and no further immediate interrogation is required, the continued operation of an LOC constitutes an unreasonable and unjustified restriction on personal liberty

It held that the SFIO failed to justify the necessity and proportionality of the restraint. The Court set aside the LOC subject to conditions: the petitioner must continue to cooperate with future investigations, intimate the Investigation Officer at least 7 days prior to any foreign travel (or 24 hours in emergencies), and seek trial court permission if a chargesheet is subsequently filed

The SFIO was directed to communicate this order to the Bureau of Immigration