Long possession does not establish adverse possession without pleadings and animus possidendi.

The plaintiff claimed that the suit property, originally belonging to his brother-in-law, Mathar Moideen, came into his possession as vacant land in October 1967; he alleged that he built a house in 1968 and obtained an electricity connection in 1971. He sought declaration and permanent injunction, asserting long possession. The defendants, Mathar Moideen’s legal heirs, denied his title and possession.

The trial court decreed the plaintiff’s suit, but the First Appellate Court reversed that decree. The plaintiff then filed this second appeal.

Whether the First Appellate Court was right to reject the plaintiff’s claim of adverse possession despite finding that he had been in possession for more than the statutory period.

Whether the First Appellate Court could dismiss the suit without expressly recording its dismissal after reversing the trial court’s decree.

Under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a second appeal concerns substantial questions of law.

A plaintiff seeking a declaration of title must establish title by sufficient evidence and cannot succeed merely on the weakness of the defence.

Long possession alone does not establish adverse possession; the claimant must plead and prove possession hostile to the true owner, including animus possidendi.

The Court also invoked Sections 151 and 153 CPC to correct the First Appellate Court’s decree.

The plaintiff admitted that the property originally belonged to Mathar Moideen, while the documents relied on were in Mathar Moideen’s name and the plaintiff had no records establishing his own title.

Although the plaintiff relied on prolonged possession, he had not pleaded adverse possession or facts showing that his possession was hostile to the original owner; the duration of possession therefore could not establish the claim.

The First Appellate Court was consequently justified in reversing the trial court’s decree.

Because that court had not expressly recorded dismissal of the suit after setting the decree aside, the High Court corrected the decree under Sections 151 and 153 CPC.

It corrected the decree to state that the trial court’s decree was set aside, the appeal in A.S. No. 42 of 2002 was allowed, and O.S. No. 678 of 1996 was dismissed. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.