Long service, service records, or regularisation cannot validate an appointment lacking lawful foundational recruitment records.

The petitioner claimed that he was appointed as a Pump Driver on 24.04.1993, had continuously worked, and was granted the benefit of the Government’s Viniymatikaran policy dated 07.10.2016 by order dated 18.08.2017.

His salary was withheld from March 2024 and he was not permitted to join or discharge his duties, allegedly without a formal termination order.

He filed a writ petition under Article 226 seeking release of salary and permission to resume service.

The respondents contended that no valid appointment order, engagement letter, selection record, or approval of the competent authority could be traced, and that the petitioner had failed to establish a lawful initial appointment.

Pursuant to the Court’s order dated 16.04.2026, a three-member committee examined the appointments of the petitioner and 21 similarly situated employees.

Its order dated 30.06.2026 found that the prescribed recruitment procedure had not been followed and that the appointments were illegal.

The petitioner sought amendment of the writ petition to challenge that enquiry order on grounds of violation of natural justice.

The amendment application was rejected because it introduced a fresh and substantially different controversy.

While the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 is not strictly governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, the principles underlying Order VI Rule 17 CPC may guide the consideration of amendment applications; an amendment may be refused where it introduces a new factual foundation, cause of action, or substantive relief and substantially enlarges the scope of the proceedings.

Long service, past payment of salary, maintenance of a service book, or subsequent administrative benefits cannot by themselves validate an appointment that was not shown to have been made by the competent authority through the prescribed recruitment procedure.

Public employment must have a lawful foundational appointment, and the absence of misconduct or the existence of equitable considerations arising from long service does not create a legal right to continue in an unauthorised appointment.

The principle of payment for work rendered cannot be used to create or continue a substantive right to public employment where the underlying appointment has not been established as lawful.

The Court held that the proposed amendment was not merely consequential: the original petition concerned withholding of salary and refusal to permit joining, whereas the amendment sought to introduce a challenge to the subsequent enquiry, including issues concerning notice, opportunity, documents considered, procedure, and the validity of the findings.

Determining those issues would require a fresh factual enquiry and a detailed response from the respondents, thereby changing the nature and scope of the proceedings.

The petitioner was therefore left to challenge the enquiry order in a properly constituted proceeding.

On the substantive claim, the Court found that the petitioner had produced no appointment order or other foundational record showing lawful selection and appointment.

His service book, long period of service, past salary, and Viniymatikaran benefit could not substitute for proof of a valid initial appointment.

Since the competent authority had found, after examining the relevant records, that the prescribed recruitment procedure was not followed and that the appointment records were unavailable, the petitioner could not claim continuation in service or salary merely because no personal misconduct had been alleged against him.

The writ petition was dismissed for lack of merit; the petitioner was held not to have established an enforceable right to salary from March 2024, to rejoin service, or to continue in public employment.

The Court clarified that dismissal of the petition and rejection of the amendment application would not prevent the petitioner from filing a fresh petition challenging the enquiry report/order dated 30.06.2026 in accordance with law.