Magistrate empowered to drop Section 12 DV Act proceedings and revoke interim orders before final disposal.

The petitioner (husband) challenged an application filed by respondent No. 1 (wife) under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act), currently pending before the Forest Magistrate, Srinagar.

The petitioner contends that the marriage was dissolved via Khula on 13.08.2021 and argues that the allegations of domestic violence are false.

On 11.11.2025, the trial Magistrate passed an ex-parte interim order directing the petitioner to pay Rs. 7,000 per month as monetary compensation.

The petitioner subsequently moved an application to drop the proceedings, but the trial Magistrate, via order dated 02.05.2026, held that a Magistrate’s Court lacks the power to drop such proceedings.

1. Whether a Magistrate has the jurisdiction to revoke or drop proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the DV Act upon finding no grounds to proceed.

2. Whether the bar against a Magistrate altering or revoking their own order applies to proceedings under the DV Act.

Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, regarding the procedure for seeking relief.

Supreme Court precedent in Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan (2022 SCC OnLine SC 446), which established that proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act are not strictly criminal in nature.

The statutory bar typically preventing a Magistrate from altering or revoking an order (Section 362 CrPC) is not attracted to these proceedings.

The law grants the Magistrate the power to call for a response and, after considering rival submissions, issue appropriate orders, which includes the power to drop proceedings if they are found to be unwarranted.

The Court reasoned that because Section 12 proceedings cannot be equated with a criminal complaint or the initiation of a prosecution, the trial Magistrate is not restricted by the rigid procedural bars of criminal law.

The Court observed that the purpose of a notice under Section 12 is to hear both sides; therefore, after obtaining a response from the husband, the Magistrate is well within his jurisdiction to revoke a summons or cancel interim monetary compensation if the facts suggest the parties were unnecessarily impleaded.

The High Court found that the trial Magistrate’s refusal to consider the petitioner’s prayer for dropping the proceedings—on the mistaken belief that such power did not exist—constituted a failure to exercise vested jurisdiction.

The High Court disposed of the petition at the threshold, directing the trial Magistrate to consider the petitioner’s prayer for dropping the proceedings on its merits; the trial Magistrate is ordered to hear both parties and pass an appropriate order expeditiously, preferably within one month.