Maintenance, including enhanced maintenance, is payable from the original application date, not merely from revision filing.

The petitioner-husband married respondent No. 1 on 30 January 2013, and their minor son, respondent No. 2, was born on 10 April 2017.

On 30 October 2018, the wife and minor son filed an application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking maintenance.

The Family Court awarded ₹7,000 per month to the wife and ₹3,000 per month to the minor son, payable from 8 April 2025, the date of its order.

In revision, the husband’s challenge was dismissed, while the wife and son’s revision was partly allowed: the son’s maintenance was enhanced to ₹9,000 per month, and the maintenance, including the enhanced amount, was directed to be payable from 30 October 2018, the date of filing of the original maintenance application.

The husband sought review under Section 362 Cr.P.C. and invoked the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to modify the retrospective operation of the maintenance direction, contending that payment should commence, at most, from the date of filing of the criminal revision.

The application for condonation of delay of 81 days in filing the miscellaneous criminal case was allowed.

Whether the direction that maintenance and enhanced maintenance be payable from the date of filing of the original Section 125 Cr.P.C. application should be reviewed or modified so that payment commences from the date of filing of the criminal revision?

Whether the petition invoking Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 read with Section 482 Cr.P.C. was maintainable for seeking the same modification of the maintenance direction?

The Court considered Section 125(2) Cr.P.C., corresponding to Section 144(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, under which maintenance is ordinarily payable from the date of the order but may, if so directed, be made payable from the date of the application.

It relied on Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324, in which the Supreme Court directed, inter alia, that maintenance ordinarily be awarded from the date of filing of the maintenance application.

The Court also recognised that interim maintenance already paid is adjustable against arrears and that amounts received in other proceedings may likewise be adjusted.

It held that relief under Section 127 Cr.P.C., corresponding to Section 146 BNSS, is appropriate where modification or enhancement is sought on account of a subsequent change in circumstances, not where the same challenge to the original direction is being repeated through inherent jurisdiction.

The Court further held that the authorities relied upon by the petitioner did not apply to the present facts.

The Court found no basis for review because the direction to make maintenance payable from 30 October 2018 was consistent with the principle recognised in Rajnesh v. Neha and was justified by the fact that the maintenance proceedings had remained pending for more than six and a half years.

Restricting payment to the date of filing of the revision would deprive the wife and minor child of maintenance for the prolonged period during which their application remained pending.

The husband’s alleged financial burden did not constitute a ground for review, particularly because interim maintenance already paid was adjustable against the arrears and the Family Court had provided for adjustment of amounts received in other proceedings.

The miscellaneous criminal case merely repeated the relief sought in the review petition and did not allege any subsequent change in circumstances warranting modification under Section 127 Cr.P.C./Section 146 BNSS.

Accordingly, the Court declined to exercise its review or inherent jurisdiction.

It dismissed Review Petition No. 1087 of 2026, holding that there was no ground to review or modify the direction making maintenance payable from the date of the original Section 125 Cr.P.C. application, i.e., 30 October 2018.

It also dismissed Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 38858 of 2026 in limine, as it repeated the relief sought in the review petition and disclosed no basis for interference under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction.