Mala fide allegations cannot be considered unless the persons accused are impleaded personally.

The appellants participated in a recruitment process for the post of Guard in a bank after their names were forwarded by the concerned bank to the Rajya Sainik Board.

Although the appellants secured the maximum marks, they were not selected because the applicable guidelines provided that, in the event of a tie, the younger candidate would rank higher in merit.

The appellants alleged that the recruitment authorities had acted mala fide and had awarded higher marks to physically weaker candidates.

Their writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 13 March 2026, following the reasoning in Dharmraj Singh Tomar v. Union of India and Others in W.P. No. 11006 of 2021.

The appellants challenged that dismissal in the present writ appeal under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005.

The bank relied upon pre-existing recruitment guidelines prescribing preference to the younger candidate where two or more candidates obtained identical marks.

1. Whether the bank’s application of the pre-existing guideline granting preference to the younger candidate in cases of equal marks was unlawful, irrational, or otherwise invalid

2. Whether the appellants’ allegations of mala fides, bias, and arbitrary award of marks could be examined when the concerned bank officers or members of the recruitment board had not been impleaded in their personal capacities

3. Whether the Single Judge’s order dismissing the writ petition warranted interference in writ appellate jurisdiction

The Court applied Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, governing the maintainability of the writ appeal.

It accepted the recruitment guideline that, where two or more candidates secure identical marks, the younger candidate shall be considered higher in merit, provided that the guideline was prior in time and had not been challenged as irrational.

The Court further applied the settled rule that allegations of mala fides or bias cannot ordinarily be examined unless the person against whom such allegations are made is impleaded by name and given an opportunity to respond.

This principle was supported by State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222; Dr. J.N. Banavalikar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1996 SC 326; and All India State Bank Officers’ Federation v. Union of India, JT 1996 (8) SC 550.

The rule is founded on natural justice and prohibits a finding of mala fides against a person who is not a party to the proceedings.

The Court held that the age-preference criterion was contained in guidelines existing before the recruitment process and that the appellants did not challenge the criterion itself as irrational.

Consequently, the bank’s preference for younger candidates in cases of equal marks could not be regarded as improper merely because the appellants were older candidates.

Regarding the allegations of mala fides and biased marking, the Court found that the officers and recruitment-board members allegedly responsible for the irregularities had not been impleaded in their individual capacities.

Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the Court held that such allegations could not be adjudicated in their absence, since doing so would violate natural justice by condemning persons without hearing them.

No other substantive ground for interference was advanced by the appellants.

It held that the bank properly applied the pre-existing tie-breaking guideline favouring the younger candidate and that the allegations of mala fides or arbitrariness were not examinable because the concerned officials had not been impleaded personally.

Finding no ground to interfere with the Single Judge’s order dated 13 March 2026, the Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal.