Facts
The appellant, a Deputy Superintendent of Excise, alleged that the respondent, a police officer, had sexually and emotionally exploited her and subsequently lodged a false FIR against her and others in retaliation for her complaint to the Director General of Police. The respondent’s FIR dated 30 August 2011 led to Karimganj P.S. Case No. 483/2011 under Sections 120B, 384, 385, 389 and 353 of the IPC read with Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2008; a police search was also conducted at the appellant’s residence.
Source reference: pp. 3–6; paras. 6–14The appellant challenged the criminal proceedings before the High Court and Supreme Court. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directions, both cases were investigated by a common senior officer. Final reports were submitted in both matters; the final report in the respondent’s case was accepted by the competent criminal court.
Source reference: pp. 6–7; paras. 15–17The appellant thereafter instituted Title Suit No. 70/2015 claiming ₹5.25 crore as special and exemplary damages for malicious prosecution, injury to reputation, humiliation and mental trauma. The Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dibrugarh dismissed the suit on 29 February 2024. Although the appellant examined four witnesses and produced 17 documents, the respondent led no evidence.
Source reference: p. 10; para. 28The present first appeal was filed under Section 96 CPC.
Source reference: p. 2; para. 2Issues
1. Whether the respondent maliciously prosecuted the appellant by lodging the FIR dated 30 August 2011, thereby causing damage to her reputation?
Source reference: p. 10; para. 27(iii)2. Whether the appellant proved that the FIR was instituted without reasonable or probable cause and with mala fide intention?
Source reference: pp. 17–18; paras. 46–473. Whether the appellant established compensable injury, including loss of reputation, humiliation and trauma, so as to claim damages of ₹5.25 crore?
Source reference: pp. 16–17, 19–20; paras. 43–45, 50–514. Whether the Trial Court erred by not framing a separate issue concerning defamation, reputational harm and trauma?
Source reference: pp. 16–17; paras. 31, 43–45Law Applied
The appeal was governed by Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which permits a first appeal against an original decree.
Source reference: p. 2; para. 2The Court applied the law of malicious prosecution, holding that the cause of action is founded on the wrongful and malicious setting of criminal law in motion; formal prosecution followed by acquittal is not invariably necessary if criminal proceedings were initiated, caused damage, and ultimately ended in the plaintiff’s favour.
Source reference: p. 17; para. 46However, the plaintiff must prove that the proceedings were instituted with malice, without reasonable or probable cause, and caused legally cognisable injury, including loss of reputation.
Source reference: pp. 17–18; para. 47The Court also applied the principle that alleged defamation or reputational injury must be established by reliable evidence showing that the plaintiff’s reputation was lowered in the estimation of others.
Source reference: pp. 19–20; paras. 50–51The appellant relied on Roop Singh v. Amarjeet Singh, 2017 (4) ICC 516, for the proposition that formal prosecution and acquittal are not indispensable.
Source reference: p. 12; para. 32Reasoning
The Court accepted the appellant’s legal proposition that formal prosecution before a criminal court is not an absolute prerequisite for an action in malicious prosecution.
Source reference: p. 17; para. 46Nevertheless, the appellant failed to discharge the evidentiary burden. The materials indicated an intimate relationship followed by disputes, repeated attempts by the appellant to contact the respondent and to settle the matter through intermediaries, and complaints by both parties.
Source reference: pp. 18–19; paras. 48–49In that factual context, the Court held that the respondent’s FIR could not be characterised as having been lodged without reasonable or probable cause or solely with malicious intent.
Source reference: pp. 20–21; paras. 52–53The appellant’s own testimony regarding damage to her reputation was not corroborated by any independent witness from her workplace, society or community who had formed an adverse opinion about her because of the FIR or investigation.
Source reference: pp. 19–20; paras. 50–51The Court also found no evidence of excess or illegality in the search and seizure conducted during the investigation, nor independent evidence that the search lowered the appellant’s reputation.
Source reference: p. 21; para. 54Issue No. 3 sufficiently covered the alleged malicious prosecution, reputational injury and resulting trauma; therefore, the absence of a separate issue on defamation did not prejudice the appellant.
Source reference: pp. 16–17; para. 45The unquantified claim of ₹5.25 crore, unsupported by any basis for computation in the plaint, further weakened the claim for damages.
Source reference: p. 17; para. 44Holding
The High Court held that the appellant failed to prove that the respondent’s FIR was lodged maliciously, without reasonable or probable cause, or that it caused compensable injury to her reputation.
The Trial Court’s findings were therefore upheld, and RFA No. 30/2024 was dismissed.
Source reference: pp. 21–22; paras. 55–59The parties were directed to bear their own costs, and the Trial Court record was ordered to be returned to the Trial Court.
Source reference: pp. 21–22; paras. 55–59Acts & Sections Cited
8 provisions across 2 statutes referred to in this judgment. Each provision opens on LawLens.
Code of Civil Procedure, 19081
Indian Penal Code, 18607
Original Court PDF
Barasha Borah BordoloivsDiganta Borah
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