Mandatory Duty to Accommodate Disabled Employees Under Section 47 PwD Act Overrides Subsequent Exemption Notifications

The Respondent, a Constable (Driver) in the CRPF since 1985, developed an ophthalmic condition in 1996 resulting in 100% blindness in his left eye and partial impairment in the right.

A Medical Board declared him permanently incapacitated, leading to his medical invalidation from service on March 11, 1998.

The Respondent initially sought invalid pension and 100% disability benefits.

A Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, invoking Section 47 of the PwD Act, 1995, ordered his reinstatement with consequential benefits.

The Division Bench dismissed the Appellants' appeal, affirming that the Appellants breached their statutory duty.

The Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that a 2002 Notification exempted the CRPF from Section 47 and that the Respondent had waived his right to reinstatement by only praying for pension.

The court primarily applied Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, which prohibits the discharge of an employee who acquires a disability during service and mandates shifting them to a suitable or supernumerary post.

It relied on Kunal Singh v. Union of India, which established that Section 47 is mandatory and cannot be overridden by pension rules.

The court further applied the principle that delegated legislation/exemption notifications are ordinarily prospective unless stated otherwise (Federation of Indian Mineral Industries v. Union of India).

Regarding waiver, it held that waiver requires the "intentional relinquishment of a known right".

The Court reasoned that Section 47 of the PwD Act imposes a proactive, mandatory duty on the employer to accommodate a disabled employee, regardless of whether the employee specifically requests such accommodation.

The Court rejected the "waiver" argument, noting that the Appellants failed to prove the Respondent had "clear knowledge" of his rights under the Act at the time of his discharge; silence due to ignorance does not constitute waiver.

On the 2002 Notification, the Court held it could not legitimize a 1998 discharge that was void ab initio for violating the statute then in force.

Although the Respondent's pleadings were deficient, the Court held that Article 226 allows High Courts to mould relief and reach "injustice wherever it is found," especially when a state authority seeks to hide behind technicalities to bypass a social welfare mandate.

The Court modified the relief to a lump-sum compensation of ₹1,25,00,000/- (Rupees one crore twenty-five lakh) covering back wages, interest, and costs, as reinstatement was no longer feasible due to superannuation.

It further directed Legal Services Authorities to assist the visually impaired Respondent in safely investing the funds.