Mandatory timelines for school fee regulation committees stayed due to operational unworkability and statutory inconsistency.

The Parliament enacted the Delhi School Education (Transparency in Fixation and Regulation of Fees) Act, 2025 (“the Act”), which came into force on December 10, 2025.

On February 1, 2026, the Respondents issued the "Delhi School Education (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2026" (“the Notification”) under Section 21 of the Act.

This Notification accelerated the statutory timelines, requiring schools to constitute School Level Fee Regulation Committees (SLFRC) by February 10, 2026, and submit fee proposals for the 2026-27 block by February 24, 2026.

The Petitioners challenged the Notification, arguing it was inconsistent with the parent Act—which specifies July timelines—and sought an interim stay on its implementation during the pendency of their challenge to the Act’s constitutionality.

Whether the Notification issued under the "removal of difficulties" clause (Section 21) is ultra vires the Act by overriding express statutory timelines and the scheme of fee fixation.

Whether the implementation of the Notification should be stayed during the pendency of the writ petitions based on the principles of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury.

The Court applied Section 21 of the Delhi School Education Act, 2025, which permits the executive to remove difficulties provided the action is "not inconsistent" with the Act.

It relied on the Supreme Court precedents in Madeva Upendra Sinai v. Union of India, which limits "Henry VIII clauses" to minor adaptations without touching the statute’s substance.

The Court also considered State of West Bengal v. Anindya Sundar Das, which prohibits changing the essential scheme of an Act under the guise of removing difficulties.

The Court also considered Section 3 (prohibition of excess fee) and Section 5(7) (permission to collect previous year's fee during disputes) of the Act.

The Court found that the Notification’s revised timelines were likely unworkable as the process of "unanimous approval" by SLFRCs and subsequent appeals to the District Fee Appellate Committee could not realistically be completed before the April 1, 2026 session.

Crucially, the Court noted that Section 3 of the Act does not create a blanket ban on collecting fees; rather, Section 5(7) expressly allows schools to collect the previous year's fees while fee determination is pending.

The Court reasoned that since the Act itself provides a fallback mechanism (collecting previous year's fees), there was no "difficulty" regarding a total loss of revenue that necessitated the Notification's hurried timelines.

Furthermore, the lack of audited financial statements for the 2025-26 period prior to April rendered the Notification’s compliance requirements practically impossible for schools.

It held that the balance of convenience favoured the Petitioners because any fee collected in the interim would be subject to the final outcome of the case and could be adjusted or refunded later, thus causing no irreparable loss to students.

The Court directed that schools are entitled to collect the same fees for the Academic Year 2026-27 as were collected in the previous year until fees are formally fixed or approved under the Act.

The applications were disposed of, and the main petitions were listed for final hearing on March 12, 2026.