Mandatory timelines for school fee regulation committees stayed due to operational unworkability and statutory inconsistency.

The Delhi School Education (Transparency in Fixation and Regulation of Fees) Act, 2025 ("Act") and its corresponding Rules were notified in late 2025.

On 01.02.2026, the Respondents issued the "Delhi School Education (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2026" ("Notification") to facilitate the constitution of School Level Fee Regulation Committees (SLFRC) for the 2026-27 academic block.

The Petitioners, representing private schools, challenged the Notification as ultra vires the Act, arguing that it arbitrarily accelerated statutory timelines (e.g., preponing the SLFRC constitution deadline from July to February) and bypassed the legislative scheme.

The Petitioners sought an interim stay on the Notification's implementation pending a final hearing on the constitutionality of the Act and Rules.

The Court applied Section 21 of the Delhi School Education Act, 2025, which permits the executive to remove difficulties provided the action is "not inconsistent" with the Act.

It relied on the Administrative Law principle from Madeva Upendra Sinai v. Union of India, stating that the "removal of difficulty" (Henry VIII) clause only allows for minor adaptations and peripheral adjustments, not changes to the substance of the statute.

Further, the Court considered the "Balance of Convenience" and "Irreparable Injury" principles for granting interim injunctions as established in Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Limited.

The Court relied on Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation, emphasizing that public interest is a material consideration in staying executive orders.

The Court found that the Notification’s revised timelines were prima facie unworkable because they failed to account for the time required for references to the District Fee Appellate Committee in cases where the SLFRC lacks unanimity.

The Court rejected the Respondents' argument that Section 3 created a total bar on fee collection; instead, it noted that Section 5(7) expressly permits schools to collect the previous year's fee during the pendency of a fee determination reference.

The Court reasoned that since the statutory process could not realistically be completed before the April 1st session start date, forcing schools to constitute committees in haste—amidst board examinations and lack of audited data—was unjustified.

It determined that the balance of convenience favored a stay because any excess fees collected by schools would remain subject to the final outcome of the litigation and could be refunded or adjusted, thus preventing irreparable loss to students.

It held that the constitution of SLFRCs is deferred during the pendency of the writ petitions.

The Court ordered that schools are entitled to collect the same fees for the Academic Year 2026-27 as were collected in the previous year, subject to the final determination of the Act's validity and any subsequent fee regulation.

The main petitions were scheduled for final hearing on 12.03.2026.