Manifest intention to arbitrate is a mandatory prerequisite for sustaining pre-arbitral interim relief under Section 9.

The Petitioner filed an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking interim injunctions against the Respondent concerning a loan agreement dated 08.07.2023.

Specifically, the Petitioner sought the deposit of the original agreement and orders restraining the Respondent from acting upon or creating third-party interests in the said agreement.

The petition remained pending before the High Court for approximately twenty months.

Although the Petitioner stated on 25.02.2025 that it was in the process of invoking arbitration, it failed to issue a notice under Section 21 of the Act or take steps to constitute an arbitral tribunal in the fourteen months following that statement.

The Court primarily applied Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which allows for interim measures but, under sub-section (2), contemplates the commencement of proceedings within ninety days of an interim order.

It further relied on the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 479, which held that a party seeking Section 9 relief before the commencement of arbitration must demonstrate a "manifest intention" to take recourse to arbitral proceedings.

The Court emphasized that Section 9 is an ancillary and facilitative remedy, not an independent substantive remedy.

The Court reasoned that Section 9 jurisdiction is premised on the existence of a genuine intention to arbitrate within a reasonable period.

In this matter, the Petitioner’s twenty-month period of inaction and failure to issue a Section 21 notice despite previous representations to the Court militated against the foundational requirement of "manifest intention".

The Court observed that Section 9 should not be utilized as a parallel forum for litigants to secure tactical advantages or maintain ad-interim arrangements while indefinitely postponing the principal remedy.

Furthermore, the fact that the Petitioner never pressed for urgent interim directions during the pendency suggested a lack of imminent danger or pressing urgency.

The Court noted that even if no interim order was passed to trigger the 90-day limit in Section 9(2), the statutory framework does not grant a license for procedural indolence.

The Court answered the core issues by ruling that a Section 9 petition cannot subsist in isolation or perpetuity without the commencement of arbitral proceedings.

Consequently, the High Court dismissed the petition and all pending applications.

No order was made as to costs.