Married Daughters’ Nearly 3-Year-Late Challenge To Final Partition Decree Fails, Karnataka HC Cites Prior Knowledge

Respondents 1 and 2 obtained a preliminary decree for partition in O.S. No. 127/2008, declaring their respective shares and the shares of other parties.

No party appealed that decree.

A final decree was passed in FDP No. 12/2009 on 16 July 2018.

The appellants, who had been defendants in the suit, appealed the final-decree order in R.A. No. 1/2022.

The appeal was delayed by two years and 363 days.

The first appellate court refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal as time-barred.

The appellants challenged that decision in this regular second appeal, relying on their status as married daughters, their residence in different places, the COVID-19 pandemic, and their claimed entitlement under Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma.

Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits a regular second appeal only where a substantial question of law arises.

An applicant seeking condonation of delay must establish sufficient cause; the court must assess the explanation in light of the circumstances and bona fides of the case.

The appellants relied on Inder Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Sri Venkategowda v. Smt. Shivamma for a pragmatic rather than hypertechnical approach to delay condonation.

The Court also referred to Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, which held that daughters are entitled to equal coparcenary rights in pending final-decree proceedings or appeals notwithstanding an earlier preliminary decree.

The Court found that the appellants’ explanations—residence in different places and the pandemic—did not justify the substantial delay.

The record showed that they knew of the final-decree proceedings; applications seeking equal shares had been rejected before the final decree and were not challenged.

The second appellant had also acknowledged that respondents 3 and 4 informed her about the case’s progress, and she later made a similar claim in execution proceedings.

The Court considered that the appeal was brought only after the final decree and during execution, and concluded that the delay lacked bona fides.

It held that the appellants’ reliance on Vineeta Sharma did not overcome their failure to challenge the relevant orders within time in the circumstances of this case.

The regular second appeal was dismissed; pending applications were disposed of as not surviving for consideration.