Material evidence may be admitted after closure of evidence where it aids adjudication and prejudice can be mitigated.

The petitions challenged a common order refusing the petitioners leave to place on record a cancellation report and accompanying documents from criminal proceedings concerning the genuineness of a Will, and refusing permission to summon Tarun Babbar to identify the signatures of his deceased father, an attesting witness to the Will.

The petitioners’ evidence in the civil suit had closed in 2018, and the suit had reached final arguments.

They stated that they obtained the complete criminal-court record in October 2024 and later located Tarun Babbar, who had provided an affidavit concerning his familiarity with his father’s signatures.

The Trial Court dismissed the applications as belated.

Whether the Trial Court was justified in refusing leave under Order VIII Rule 1A(3) CPC to produce the cancellation report and accompanying documents at the advanced stage of the suit.

Whether the Trial Court was justified in refusing permission under Order XVI CPC to summon Tarun Babbar to identify his deceased father’s signatures on the Will.

Under Order VIII Rule 1A(3) CPC and Order XVI CPC, a court may permit production of documents or examination of a witness after the usual evidentiary stage, but relevance alone does not entitle a party to reopen its case.

The court must assess the explanation for delay, the stage of proceedings, the materiality of the evidence, its effect on the party’s case, and prejudice to the opposing party; safeguards or costs may address prejudice.

Sugandhi (Dead) by LRs. v. P. Rajkumar and Levaku Pedda Reddamma v. Gottumukkala Venkata Subbamma support a justice-oriented exercise of discretion and permit delay to be addressed, where appropriate, through costs.

Sudesh v. Vijender Singh identifies materiality, bona fides, irreversible prejudice, and the availability of safeguards as relevant considerations when deciding whether to reopen evidence.

Proof of the signatures and sufficiency of the proposed testimony remain matters for the Trial Court under the applicable evidence law, including Sections 67 and 68 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.

The Court held that the applications’ lateness and the closure of evidence warranted scrutiny but were not, by themselves, decisive.

The documents arose from criminal proceedings concerning the same Will already in dispute and did not introduce a new case; their relevance and evidentiary effect were for the Trial Court to assess.

Tarun Babbar was proposed to identify his father’s signatures on an existing document, rather than to introduce a new factual foundation.

The respondent could cross-examine him and contest his familiarity with the signatures, as well as the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence; any prejudice could therefore be addressed through procedural safeguards.

The Trial Court had adopted an unduly restrictive approach by treating delay and procedural stage as determinative without sufficiently considering materiality.

It directed the Trial Court to complete Tarun Babbar’s examination on one date, subject to its convenience, and thereafter proceed with the suit in accordance with law, without being influenced by the judgment except as necessary to implement it.

The Court expressed no opinion on the merits of the dispute.