Medical evidence of hymenal rupture through finger insertion establishes aggravated penetrative sexual assault under POCSO.

The Appellant was convicted by the Special Judge, Wardha, for the sexual assault of a five-year-and-eleven-month-old girl.

On October 11, 2015, the victim went to the Appellant’s (a neighbor) house to play, where he inserted his finger into her vagina, causing profuse bleeding and hymenal tears.

The victim narrated the incident to her grandmother and uncle (PW-2), leading to an FIR.

The Trial Court sentenced the Appellant to life imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life under Section 376(2)(f)(i) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The Appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of alibi, false implication due to political enmity, and procedural discrepancies in the investigation.

Whether the prosecution proved that the accused committed penetrative sexual assault on the six-year-old victim under Section 5(i)(m)&(p) of the POCSO Act and Section 376(2)(f)(i) of the IPC?

Whether the alleged discrepancies in the spot panchanama (ward number) and the delay in assigning property numbers to seized articles vitiate the trial?

Whether the evidence of witnesses is inadmissible under Section 162 CrPC because they allegedly refreshed their memory using police statements before testifying?

The court applied Section 375(b) of the IPC, which defines "rape" to include the insertion of any part of the body (other than the penis) into the vagina.

It applied Section 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act regarding aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a child.

Regarding procedural bars, the court relied on Section 162 of the CrPC and the Full Bench decision in *Nathu Manchhu v. State of Gujarat*, which clarifies that reading a police statement before entering the box does not render evidence inadmissible but may affect its probative value.

Additionally, Section 42 of the POCSO Act was applied, mandates that the offender be punished with the greater degree of punishment when an act is an offence under both the IPC and POCSO.

The Court found the victim’s (PW-4) testimony consistent and credible, noting her visible trauma (demeanor) upon seeing the accused three years later.

Her testimony was corroborated by medical evidence (PW-6), which confirmed multiple hymenal tears and vaginal clots consistent with digital penetration.

Scientific evidence, including DNA profiling, matched the blood on the victim's clothes to the scene and the victim.

The Court dismissed the plea of alibi as unsubstantiated and the plea of false implication as contradictory to the Appellant’s own suggestion of "cordial relations" during cross-examination.

Minor discrepancies in ward numbers in the panchanama were deemed immaterial as the Investigating Officer was not challenged on this specific fact during cross-examination.

Regarding Section 162 CrPC, the Court held that even if a witness glanced at documents, it did not amount to the prohibited "use" of a statement at trial that would trigger inadmissibility.

The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and the sentence of life imprisonment for the remainder of the Appellant's natural life.

It specifically refused to reduce the sentence to 14 years, distinguishing the case from cited precedents based on the gravity of the "grotesque, diabolical and dastardly" assault on a five-year-old child.