Medically corroborated testimony of rape victims sustains gang-rape convictions despite delayed disclosure and a second FIR.

On 19 March 2013, the appellants allegedly entered the victims’ house at night, assaulted the victims, their parents and relatives with weapons, and subjected two victims, “A” and “B”, to gang rape.

An uncle initially lodged Crime No. 96/2013 alleging house-trespass, assault, robbery and related offences, but did not mention rape. During medical examination, the victims disclosed the rape allegations, following which a second FIR, Crime No. 97/2013, was registered under Sections 376(2)(g) and 450 IPC and Sections 4/6 of the POCSO Act.

The appellants were separately tried in SCDOCT No. 28/2013 for the assault-related offences and were acquitted.

In the present case, the Trial Court convicted the appellants under Sections 376D and 450 IPC, sentencing them to life imprisonment for gang rape and five years’ rigorous imprisonment for house-trespass, with fines; the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

Whether the second FIR alleging gang rape was legally maintainable when the rape formed part of the same transaction covered by the first FIR?

Whether the evidence of victims “A” and “B”, considered alongside their medical evidence and the evidence of other injured witnesses, proved gang rape by the appellants beyond reasonable doubt?

Whether the appellants’ convictions under Sections 376D and 450 IPC were sustainable despite the acquittal in the connected assault trial and the initial omission of rape allegations from the first FIR?

Whether the life-imprisonment sentence under Section 376D IPC was disproportionate and ought to be reduced to 20 years?

The Court applied Sections 376D and 450 IPC, holding that gang rape committed after unlawful house-trespass attracts the statutory offences of gang rape and house-trespass for the purpose of committing an offence.

It considered the principles governing successive FIRs in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181, which generally prohibits successive FIRs concerning the same incident, subject to recognised exceptions; Kari Choudhary v. Sita Devi, (2002) 1 SCC 714, and Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292, which recognise counter-versions and distinct investigations; and Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab, (2009) 1 SCC 441, which permits a later FIR where a distinct offence or larger factual discovery emerges.

Section 40 of the Evidence Act was applied to treat the prior judgment in the connected trial as relevant to the question of a further trial, without reopening or setting aside that acquittal.

The Court also relied on Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365, for the principle that an incriminating answer to a defence suggestion may be considered with other evidence, although a suggestion alone cannot sustain conviction.

Under Section 376D, as amended with effect from 3 February 2013, gang rape carried a minimum sentence of 20 years, extendable to imprisonment for the remainder of the offender’s natural life, with fine.

The Court considered that the two FIRs arose from a single transaction and observed that the police ought ordinarily to have incorporated the rape allegations into the first FIR. Nevertheless, since the victims disclosed the rape during medical examination and the second FIR concerned a separately discovered and distinct sexual offence, the Court declined to interfere with the proceedings on that ground.

The testimony of both victims consistently attributed the rape of victim “A” to Mahipal and Kuldeep and the rape of victim “B” to Jitendra and Rajesh.

Their accounts were corroborated by the medical reports showing recent hymenal rupture and findings consistent with forcible intercourse within 24 hours.

The Court also relied on the additional injury reports from the connected trial, which showed that both victims and several relatives had suffered injuries during the same occurrence, thereby corroborating the prosecution’s explanation that the victims initially disclosed only the assault and later revealed the rape due to shame and trauma.

The acquittal in the connected case was not treated as determinative of the rape charge because that judgment could not be set aside in the present appeal; however, the medical material proved in that proceeding was considered relevant under Section 40 of the Evidence Act.

The Court further held that the omission of rape from the first FIR was plausibly explained by the victims’ reluctance to disclose the sexual assault immediately, and noted an accepted defence suggestion to that effect as supporting, though not independently establishing, the prosecution case.

Given the brutality of the assault, the participation of multiple accused, and the statutory sentencing framework applicable on the date of occurrence, the life sentence was held proportionate.

The convictions under Sections 376D and 450 IPC and the sentences imposed by the Trial Court were affirmed.

The request to reduce life imprisonment to 20 years was rejected because Section 376D, as applicable on 19 March 2013, permitted imprisonment for the remainder of the offender’s natural life.

The appeal was dismissed.

The bail and surety bonds of appellants Mahipal Singh, Rajesh and Kuldeep were cancelled, and they were directed to surrender before the Trial Court within one month to undergo the remaining sentence; appellant Jitendra, already in custody, was directed to serve the remainder of his sentence.