Mere allegation of enemy-property vesting neither ousts Rent Controller jurisdiction nor defeats eviction.

The Petitioners challenged the order dated 26 May 2026 of the learned ARC-02, Central District, Delhi, whereby their application for leave to defend was dismissed and an eviction order was passed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, concerning portions of property bearing No. 481, Chatta Haji Yusuf, Chitli Gate, Chawri Bazar, Delhi.

Before the High Court, the Petitioners confined their challenge to the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the learned ARC.

They contended that the premises constituted “enemy property” because a previous owner, Haji Mohd. Muslim, had become a Pakistani national, resulting in vesting of the property in the Government of India and the Custodian of Enemy Property.

The Petitioners further claimed that they had consequently become tenants of the Government and that no landlord–tenant relationship existed between them and the Respondent.

The learned ARC rejected these objections, holding that the Respondent had demonstrated a title superior to that of the Petitioners and that any dispute regarding enemy-property vesting was a title dispute beyond the scope of the eviction proceedings.

Whether the alleged status of the premises as enemy property divested the Respondent of the right to maintain an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act or ousted the jurisdiction of the learned ARC?

Whether the Respondent was required to establish absolute ownership, or whether a title superior to that of the Petitioners was sufficient to maintain the eviction petition?

Whether the impugned order disclosed any jurisdictional error, material illegality, perversity, or error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act?

The Court applied the proviso to Section 25-B(8), read with Section 25-B(9), of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, holding that the High Court’s jurisdiction is supervisory and revisional rather than appellate; interference is warranted only for a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, absence of adjudication, or an error apparent on the face of the record.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, the Court reiterated that revisional jurisdiction cannot be used to substitute the High Court’s view for that of the Rent Controller.

For an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e), the landlord need not prove an absolute or indefeasible title; it is sufficient to establish a title or right superior to that of the tenant, as recognised in Jiwan Lal v. Gurdial Kaur, Ramesh Chand v. Uganti Devi, and Smt. Shanti Sharma v. Smt. Ved Prabha.

Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, embodying tenant estoppel, prevents a tenant from denying the title of the landlord under whom the tenancy was accepted during its continuance.

A mere assertion of enemy-property vesting does not, without adjudication or enforcement by the competent authority, defeat the landlord’s eviction proceedings or require the Rent Controller to decide complicated title questions.

The High Court found that the Petitioners had admitted that their predecessors were inducted as tenants by the erstwhile owners and that the Respondent relied upon a registered sale deed forming part of the acknowledged chain of title.

Applying the settled standard under Section 14(1)(e), the Court held that the Respondent was required only to show a better title than the Petitioners, which he had done.

The Petitioners’ plea that the property had vested in the Government as enemy property raised a disputed question of title, but the mere existence of that plea did not automatically extinguish the Respondent’s right to maintain the eviction petition or deprive the ARC of jurisdiction.

If the Custodian of Enemy Property claimed an independent right or sought possession, the appropriate remedy was to initiate proceedings before the competent forum; the ARC was not required to adjudicate such complicated title questions in the summary eviction proceedings.

Further, having accepted tenancy under the erstwhile owners, the Petitioners could not rely on the alleged superior title of the Government to deny the Respondent’s entitlement in the pending tenancy proceedings, particularly in view of tenant estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act.

Since the ARC had considered and rejected the jurisdictional objection through a legally permissible reasoning process, no ground for revisional interference was established.

The Respondent had established a title superior to that of the Petitioners, which was sufficient for proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.

The impugned order disclosed no jurisdictional error, material illegality, perversity, or error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference under Section 25-B(8).

The revision petition was accordingly dismissed, and all pending applications were also dismissed.