Mere breach of contract lacks criminal intent for cheating or criminal breach of trust absent dishonest inducement.

The Petitioners in WP 1284/2013 ("Chougule and others") are directors/officers of Champagne Indage Limited (CIL).

In 2008, CIL entered into an agreement with Indapur Winery Society to lift wine stock, agreeing to pay 50% in advance and the balance within 45 days of lifting.

Respondent Jadhav filed an FIR (C.R. No. 88/2011) alleging that despite lifting 32,000 liters of wine valued at ₹42,81,567/-, CIL paid nothing, changed its corporate name to Indage Vintners Limited (IVL), and disposed of the stock with dishonest intent to cheat.

Chougule and others sought to quash the FIR, arguing it was a commercial dispute.

Conversely, Jadhav filed WP 2415/2017 seeking to transfer the investigation to the CID, Pune.

The court primarily applied the principles for quashing an FIR established in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which allow for the exercise of inherent powers where allegations, even if taken at face value, do not constitute an offence or where proceedings are maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive.

It applied the distinction between a breach of contract and the offence of cheating (Section 420 IPC), requiring dishonest intent at the inception as per Vesa Holdings P. Ltd. v. State of Kerala.

It further relied on Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat regarding the lack of vicarious liability for directors in the absence of specific allegations.

It further relied on K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India regarding the effect of suppressing material facts.

The court observed that the FIR lacked specific particulars regarding the roles of individual directors and failed to demonstrate fraudulent intent at the time the agreement was signed.

Crucially, the court found that the complainant suppressed a 2010 communication showing they were aware of CIL’s name change and financial crisis, and ignored an offer by the company to return the goods.

The court noted the "mechanical and unreliable nature" of the allegations, as the FIR named a person who had died before the agreement was even executed and another who had resigned years prior.

The court determined that the dispute was purely contractual and that criminal law was being invoked solely to pressure the directors for the recovery of dues.

The court held that the allegations did not prima facie constitute a cognizable offence and were attended by mala fides. Consequently, Writ Petition No. 2415 of 2017 seeking the transfer of the investigation was dismissed.