Mere delay or non-disposal of interim application constitutes insufficient grounds to terminate arbitrator's mandate for bias.

The applicant, a construction company, filed an application under Sections 11, 14, and 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking to terminate the mandate of the existing sole Arbitrator and appoint a new one

The applicant alleged that proceedings were delayed due to the Arbitrator’s prolonged absence between February 18, 2026, and May 23, 2026

The applicant further contended that a Section 17 application remained pending for a long time, leading to an apprehension that they would not receive justice

The respondent countered that the applicant suppressed the fact that an amended statement of claim was filed in September and a defense claim in October, meaning the statutory period for the Arbitrator to decide the matter had not yet expired

1. Whether the mandate of the Arbitrator should be terminated on the grounds of delay and failure to adhere to the statutory timeline under the Act of 1996

2. Whether an apprehension of bias or lack of justice due to the slow disposal of interim applications (Section 17) constitutes a valid ground for the replacement of an Arbitrator

The court applied Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which govern the termination of an arbitrator's mandate and the substitution of arbitrators

It also relied on the statutory timelines prescribed under the Act for the completion of pleadings (six months) and the passing of an award (twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings)

The court upheld the principle that a mandate cannot be terminated unless there is cogent material showing the Arbitrator failed to adhere to these legal timelines

The Court examined the timeline of the arbitral proceedings and found that since the amended statement of claim and the defense were filed in September and October respectively, the Arbitrator still has until October 2026 (four months remaining) to complete the proceedings

The Court noted that the applicant's failure to mention the filing of the amended claim in their initial pleadings was a material omission

Regarding the Section 17 application delay, the Court reasoned that the slow disposal of interim applications does not inherently prove bias or mala fide intent

The Court determined that there was no "cogent material" to prove that the Arbitrator had breached the statutory timeline or acted in a biased manner that would warrant the termination of the mandate

The Court disposed of the application with the observation that the Arbitrator is expected to decide the pending Section 17 application and the final matter in accordance with the law and the available material