Mere execution of a sale deed asserting ownership does not constitute forgery or cheating.

The applicant sought to quash FIR No. I-C.R. 1/2014 registered at DCB Police Station, Vadodara, alleging violations of Sections 406, 420, 465, 467, 471, and 120B of the IPC.

The complainant alleged that his uncle purchased land in 1994, but discovered in 2009 that Accused No. 1 (Chhotaram, now deceased) had sold the same land to Accused No. 2 (the applicant) in 2008 using a fabricated pedigree.

The applicant contended he was a bona fide purchaser for value who relied on revenue records which did not reflect the 1994 transaction.

Civil litigation regarding the title was already pending.

1. Whether the ingredients of criminal breach of trust (Section 406) and cheating (Section 420) are made out against a subsequent purchaser in a property dispute.

2. Whether the execution of a sale deed by a person claiming ownership, even if the claim is disputed, constitutes forgery under Sections 465, 467, or 471.

3. Whether the continuation of criminal proceedings in a dispute of a predominantly civil nature constitutes an abuse of the process of law.

The court applied Section 405 IPC, noting that "entrustment" is a prerequisite for criminal breach of trust.

Regarding cheating, it relied on Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, holding that fraudulent intention must exist at the inception of the transaction.

For forgery, it applied Sections 463 and 464 IPC alongside the principles in Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj, observing that an imposter must exist to constitute a "false document".

It further relied on Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, which established that a person signing a document in their own name asserting a claim (even if incorrect) does not commit forgery.

The distinction between Sections 406 and 420 was drawn using S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar.

The Court reasoned that Section 406 was inapplicable because there was no "entrustment" of property to the applicant; the matter involved a standard sale-purchase transaction.

Section 420 failed because the applicant did not induce the complainant to deliver property; rather, the applicant was the one who paid consideration.

Regarding forgery (Sections 467, 471), the Court found that Accused No. 1 signed the deed in his own name. Following Mohd. Ibrahim, executing a deed for land one does not own is not "forgery" if the maker does not impersonate another.

The Court emphasized that the applicant acted with due diligence by checking revenue records, which were silent on the 1994 sale.

Finally, the Court noted that the dispute was essentially civil, involving succession and title claims already pending in civil court.

The application was allowed, and FIR No. I-C.R. 1/2014, along with all consequential proceedings, was quashed and set aside as against the applicant.

The Court concluded that continuing the criminal prosecution would amount to an abuse of the process of law.