Mere issuance of a subsequent notice creates no independent cause of action for a second writ petition.

The appellants had earlier filed W.P.(C) No. 1787 of 2025 concerning notices issued by Nagar Palika Nigam, Durg in relation to their alleged encroachment over disputed land.

By order dated 08.04.2025, the Single Judge granted them liberty to submit an application with supporting documents before the competent authorities and directed the authorities to consider it by 24.04.2025.

The appellants submitted their representation, following which the Nagar Palika Nigam issued a notice dated 24.04.2025. They challenged that notice by filing W.P.(C) No. 2132 of 2025, which was dismissed on 28.04.2025 on the ground that the subsequent petition involved the same cause of action and constituted an abuse of the process of law.

The appellants thereafter preferred the present intra-court writ appeal, contending that the notice dated 24.04.2025 created a fresh cause of action.

Whether the filing of the second writ petition challenging the notice dated 24.04.2025 was maintainable, or amounted to abuse of the process of law on account of the earlier writ petition concerning the same subject matter?

Whether the notice issued pursuant to the order dated 08.04.2025 gave rise to an independent and fresh cause of action warranting interference in the second writ petition?

The Court applied the principle that a subsequent writ petition on the same cause of action and subject matter is not maintainable where the earlier proceedings have already been disposed of with appropriate liberty or directions; such successive litigation may constitute an abuse of the process of law.

It further held that the mere issuance of a consequential notice pursuant to an earlier judicial order does not, by itself, create an independent cause of action when the petitioners are required to pursue the remedy before the competent authority.

The Court also recognized that alleged encroachers must be afforded an opportunity of hearing and that appropriate eviction action may follow if they fail to establish their entitlement.

The Division Bench found that the earlier writ petition had not left the appellants without a remedy; rather, it expressly permitted them to file a representation with relevant documents and directed the authorities to decide the matter by 24.04.2025.

The appellants admittedly availed that opportunity, and the notice dated 24.04.2025 was issued in the course of the authorities’ consideration of their claim.

Consequently, the notice was treated as a consequential step in the same proceedings and not as an independent cause of action.

The proper course was to pursue the statutory or administrative process before the competent authority, rather than institute a second writ petition on the same subject matter.

The Single Judge therefore correctly characterized the second petition as an abuse of process.

It held that the subsequent notice dated 24.04.2025 did not create a fresh cause of action and that W.P.(C) No. 2132 of 2025 was rightly dismissed as an abuse of the process of law.

Finding no infirmity in the order dated 28.04.2025, the Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal.